

INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION
PAPERS

34

THE EFFECTIVENESS OF
SETTLEMENT AND INTEGRATION
POLICIES TOWARDS IMMIGRANTS
AND THEIR DESCENDANTS
IN SWEDEN

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1. Brief historical background

1.1 *Ethnic homogeneity and historical multiculturality*

Sweden is a small country of close to nine million inhabitants. It is an old state, one of Europe's oldest, formed when the Viking era was drawing to an end and Christianity was adopted by the ruling classes (around the year 1000). The core regions have never been subjected to foreign occupation or rule. Eleven percent of the contemporary population of Sweden represents persons born in other countries (the first generation). If their children (the second generation) are included the population of *non-Swedish origin* is eighteen percent. These figures suggest that Sweden has a multicultural condition.

One of the nationalist myths is that Sweden used to be an ethnically homogeneous nation—one people, one race, one language, one church, one historically given territory, one common culture, and one recognized centre of power. Even those who refute nationalistic views usually accept this description. For nationalists, multiculturality is the result of uncontrolled and encouraged immigration of 'racially inferior' and culturally alien elements. Historical data tell another story. If multiculturality implies the co-presence of different cultural groups, or *ethnies*, within the politico-territorial unit defined as the Swedish state, the truth is that it practically always has been a multicultural entity, although the distribution and location of the non-Swedish speaking population has changed over the centuries.

Reindeer herding Saamis have always existed within the boundaries of the Swedish state. They have been the victims of degradation, persecution, and internal colonialism. As other autochthonous peoples, the Saami identify themselves as belonging to the Fourth World. Saami history is one of displacement, unequal rights, and non-recognition. Even today the Swedish state refuses to recognize Saami territorial claims. Furthermore, a Finnish speaking border minority in the north was denied rights to its language as late as the 1970s. Archaeological data, historical records, and place names indicate that ethnic Swedish presence in the northern hinterland is of a fairly recent date, that is to say, it has developed over the past two hundred years.

Looking back three hundred years in time, the equivalent of say ten generations, plurality was obvious. Within the bounds of the state, Swedish speakers were a numerical minority. In addition to the Saami there were Finns, Russians, Estonians, Livonians, Latvians, Prussians, Poles, Germans, Danes, and Norwegians. These peoples inhabited regions that had been annexed by conquest in war. There was little intermixing. Looking even further back in history to the Hanseatic trade of the fifteenth century and earlier, trading ports such as Visby, Stockholm, and Kalmar were virtually German cities. This massive German presence left a permanent imprint on the development of the Swedish language. Prior to the nineteenth century, the most important immigration consisted of Finnish burn-beating peasants, skilled Walloon

labour, Scottish military advisors, and Dutch city planners. The Finns and Walloons maintained their cultural identities for generations.

In keeping with these historical facts the conception of a lost cultural homogeneity is mistaken. What it stands for is a strong centralized power that did not hesitate to crush provincial or ethnic opposition. Power is still highly centralized, and this is what so many 'denizens' in Sweden experience. At the same time there is a strong egalitarian strain in Sweden. Its historical roots are to be found in the strong position of free peasants as one of the estates of the realm prior to the twentieth century. The feudal system was never introduced in Sweden. This historically based and popular egalitarian tradition has co-existed but also conflicted with a subtle but bureaucratic and sometimes arrogant exercise of power, often full of good intentions but almost always streamlining solutions that don't take the little man's experiences and wishes into account, nor those of marginalized minority groups. It was precisely the absence of a feudal system that laid the foundations of an exceptionally strong central power, in earlier centuries invested in the Crown, in modern times in an independent, powerful, and centralized bureaucracy. Central control and egalitarianism have characterized the integration models in Sweden, much to the confusion of many immigrants. It is not a coincidence, then, that Tomas Hammar (1990) modelled his concept of *denizenship* upon Sweden's experiences of seeking ways to integrate its foreign born population. The difficulties that multiculturalism has faced in Sweden must be understood in terms of these historically rooted contradictions.

From the mid-nineteenth century to about 1930 an estimated one million Swedes emigrated to the United States, representing approximately one-fourth of the population. At the end of the 1930s Jewish refugees from Germany sought asylum in Sweden. A few were accepted but the majority of these asylum seekers were rejected. This was an episode in Swedish immigration history which is most embarrassing to posterity. Swedish academics played a leading role in the anti-Jewish policies. The modern era of immigration to Sweden started during World War II, in the early 1940s. Essentially the comparatively generous refugee policies from the final stages of the war, and which dominated the post-war period may be understood as amends in regard to the narrow-minded chauvinistic immigration policies of the 1930s.

1.2 Refugees during the war and early post war years

Basically, immigration to Sweden since 1940 may be thought of as dividing into four rather distinct stages, each one representing different categories of immigrants and types of immigration, although obviously there is a considerable amount of overlapping between the categories.

- 1) Refugees from neighbouring countries 1940—48
- 2) Labour immigration from Finland and Southern Europe 1949—71
- 3) Family reunification and refugees from Third World countries 1972—89

- 4) Asylum-seekers from South-eastern Europe 1990— and the free movement of professionals within the European Community.

Table 1 gives foreign-born persons residing in Sweden in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1998.

The first stage (1943—48) was one of refugee resettlement. During the war numbers of refugees from neighbouring countries sought asylum in Sweden. The first were Finnish children who were evacuated from Helsinki and other Finnish cities at the time of the Soviet attack in 1939. Quite a few of the 70,000 Finnish children brought to Sweden during the war were adopted by their foster parents and remained in Sweden. During the German occupation of Denmark and Norway Jews, socialists and threatened members of the resistance fled to Sweden. Towards the end of the war people fled from Estonia and Latvia crossing the Baltic in small vessels. Many continued to the USA, Canada and Australia, but some 30,000 Estonians and 5,000 Latvians remained in Sweden.

After the war people of various backgrounds ended up in Sweden. The Bernadotte expeditions brought about 30,000 survivors from Nazi concentration camps to Sweden. Undoubtedly some people who found their way to Sweden had been Nazi collaborators in the neighbouring countries, the Baltic republics, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Sweden accepted and resettled a great number of people during the course of a few years. There was no ready organization to integrate these refugees into society. Due to the wartime conditions there was a shortage of manpower. Thus incorporation into society was a matter of getting into the labour market. Since there was no shortage of jobs, able bodied males were given menial jobs in industry and forestry. Women were also able to find work. The wartime experiences of placing refugees in industry served as a model for integration policies for the following forty years.

1.3 Labour immigration from Finland and Southern Europe

The second phase (1949—71) represents the virtually free entry of labour immigrants from Finland and Southern Europe. By the end of the 1940s when the bombed cities of Europe were being reconstructed Swedish export industry flourished. The industrial infrastructure—factories, transport facilities, etc.—was not destroyed or even damaged as the case was in most of Europe. At the time, there was a constant shortage of labour despite women's participation in the labour market on a scale previously unknown in Sweden. Generally, employers were satisfied with the foreign labour (the refugees). Thus, major companies started to recruit skilled labour from Italy. What was seen as quite a large Italian migration to Sweden at the time took place in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The children and grandchildren of these migrants are now assimilated into Swedish society.

In 1954 the five Nordic countries (Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden) set

up a common labour market, abolishing restrictions on the movement of manpower between the countries. This treaty made large-scale emigration of Finns to Sweden possible during the 1950s and 1960s. By the late 1950s companies turned to Yugoslavia and Greece for manpower, initiating quite a substantial migration from these countries. During the 1960s Turks found their way to Sweden. Quite a few came from the rural district around Kulu in central Anatolia.

However, by the mid-1960s Swedish authorities became concerned about the long-term consequences of migration on society. Committees and commissions were authorized to deal with practical matters of immigrant adjustment, information and legal issues relating to residence permits, work permits and citizenship. One of these commissions was assigned to outline a future immigrant and minority policy. In 1967 restrictions on immigration were enforced. Work permits before arrival were required of immigrants (from non-Nordic countries) for residence permits to be issued. This measure put a stop to spontaneous migration to Sweden. Companies were not dissuaded from recruiting labour abroad, however. An important milestone in the process of bringing immigration to the forefront of public attention and concern was the founding of the National Board of Immigration in 1969. By the end of the decade research groups were organized at the universities of Stockholm and Lund.

Immigration rates peaked in 1969 and 1970, approaching a net of 70,000 persons per year. In the early 1970s thoughts about curbing labour migration began to appear simultaneously in Western Europe. Labour immigration to Sweden from non-Nordic countries came to an end in 1972. No explicit decision to this effect was ever made in Parliament. What happened was that the Labour Organization (LO) objected to further labour immigration. This decision marked the end of almost a quarter of a century of free immigration to Sweden.

1.4 Third World refugees

The third phase of immigration (1972—89) was one dominated by asylum-seekers from Third World countries with a subsequent process of family reunification. In the early 1970s the flow of refugees to Sweden was not very large. A majority of the refugees during the years of labour migration came from Eastern Europe, and were part of an annual quota of 1,250 persons that Sweden had pledged to accept from camps run by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees. The first Third World group to be accepted were about 800 Ugandan Asians, expelled by Idi Amin. They comprised of several different groups originating from Gujarat and the Punjab, whose parents and grandparents had settled in East Africa during the heyday of British colonisation.

The following year a considerable number of refugees were accepted from Chile after the coup against Allende, eventually leading to a process of chain migration to Sweden. The first Chilean refugees were undoubtedly political activists, who were threatened and persecuted by the Pinochet regime. Many were students and trade union leaders.

However, since the mid-1980s there is reason to believe that many "asylum seekers" from Chile were not altogether genuine political refugees but rather economic migrants, hoping to improve their standard of living, sponsored by members of their extended families dwelling in Sweden. During the years Allende was in power, members of the left wing opposition, trade unionists etc. from other Latin American countries sought refuge in Santiago. They too fled from the persecution by the Pinochet regime. So, people from countries such as Argentina, Uruguay, Bolivia, Brazil and Peru also sought refuge in Sweden. Once democratic rule was restored in these countries many returned. Quite a few Chileans, however, having married and raised families in Sweden, are finding that return to their native country is a lot more difficult than they had anticipated. Parents and children may have very different views about what country to live in.

During the 1970s and 1980s there were also refugees from the Middle East. The Assyrians are a Christian minority from Eastern Turkey, Lebanon and Syria, in Sweden centring in the industrial town of Södertälje near Stockholm. The Assyrians sought asylum on the grounds of religious persecution. The authorities accepted them on general humanitarian grounds, but did not regard them as refugees in the strict sense laid down in the Geneva convention. In Södertälje tension built up between Assyrians and native inhabitants, at times surfacing in street-fighting. The Assyrian networks of migration have challenged the authorities' conception of a controlled and monitored migration/integration process. Eventually the Södertälje experiences led the authorities to adopt a policy of settlement through dispersal that was enacted in 1985.

Another salient group are the Kurds, emigrating from Eastern Turkey, Iran and Iraq. Around the mid-1980s some individual Kurdish defectors were executed by the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK). When prime minister Olof Palme shortly afterwards was assassinated the police immediately suspected Kurdish terrorists. Individual Kurds, believed to support the PKK, were prohibited to journey beyond the municipality in which they were domiciled. A year of police investigation led to nothing. The negative publicity, however, has done great harm to the public image of the Kurds.

By far the largest group from the Middle East are the Iranians, mainly consisting of young urban middle class families, many of them academics and intellectuals from Teheran. Currently the Iranians number more than 50,000 persons making them one of the largest immigrant groups in Sweden. Refugees from Ethiopia and Eritrea in the 1980s and Somalia more recently are facing great problems of integration as a consequence of racism and discrimination in the labour market. Ideas about voluntary repatriation have emerged and are being considered by the authorities.

In 1975 parliament adopted an "immigrant", or rather, integration policy. This policy was a radical break with the traditional view of assimilation as a solution to the problem of incorporating immigrants into mainstream society. Sweden was viewed as developing into an ethnically pluralistic society. Immigrant minorities were granted the option of

integrating into Swedish society without being required to assimilate culturally. The programme was condensed into three principal objectives: *equality*, *freedom of choice*, and *partnership* (more about these objectives in chapter 3). Essentially, immigrants residing in Sweden on a permanent basis enjoy the same rights as Swedes. They may wish to assimilate into Swedish ways of life or maintain their distinctive native cultures. Whatever preference this is a personal matter and of no concern to the authorities, except for the requirement that their integration model should not conflict with essential Swedish values and norms. This multicultural model developed out of societal needs to handle the increasing immigration of European labour in the late 1960s. It was adopted at a time, however, when labour immigration from non-Nordic countries had ceased.

Labour immigrants from the previous years were of course still residing in Sweden. Their children benefited from programmes of mother-tongue instruction in the schools. The bulk of the labour immigrants had come from Finland, Yugoslavia, Greece, Italy and Turkey. The number of languages that needed to be taught to their children were limited. Initially the programme was operational and served its purposes as intended. In time, however, the ethnic and cultural composition of the immigrant communities changed in such a way that mother tongue instruction in the schools became increasingly difficult to organize for economic and political reasons. Refugees and family reunifications from Third World countries, constituting the main volume of immigration since 1972, represent a more diverse spectrum of cultures and languages. Moreover, most groups are not particularly large in numbers (with the exception of Chileans and Iranians). This tendency was reinforced by the dispersal policy from 1985. Implementing the multicultural programmes in this changing situation of immigration met with organizational problems, such as recruiting qualified teachers etc.

1.5 Post-Cold War developments

The colonies of newcomers that established over time in Sweden were instrumental for bringing about chain migration processes. New arrivals came as political refugees or via the gate of family reunification, since labour immigration was not allowed. Initially quite a few were granted asylum for humanitarian reasons, but the authorities wanted to close this gate in order to assume control over immigration. Inevitably every attempt to do so led to opposition from left and liberal quarters. Most newcomers moved to major cities and university towns. Networks between immigrants living in Sweden and relatives or friends in their home countries led to a growing number of asylum seekers.

In December 1989 the government, led by the Social Democrats then in power, put its foot down and ruled that as from then applications for political asylum would be treated strictly in accordance with the Geneva convention. So called "de facto refugees", previously permitted to stay in Sweden on humanitarian grounds, would no longer be granted asylum. In 1990 a decrease in the number of asylum seekers was apparent (table 5). What the government didn't anticipate was that the new directions triggered a wave of attacks against refugee camps and reception centres. The message to

potential asylum seekers that "phony refugees" no longer would be accepted served as a signal to racist organizations and other groups on the extreme right that their criticism of the immigration policies had won the approval of the government. A coalition of Conservatives, Liberals, Centre Party and Christian Democrats assumed power in 1991. This government resumed a more liberal interpretation of refugee status. However, the harm had already been done and attacks against refugee centres continued. The influx of refugees soon started to rise again.

There may be different views about when the Cold War actually came to an end, but the symbolic event above all others is of course the "deconstruction" of the Berlin Wall in December 1989. Throughout the Cold War a flow of Eastern Europeans sought asylum in Sweden. Each uprising against Soviet domination in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary gave rise to new waves of refugees. In 1956 and 1957 some 8,000 Hungarian refugees came to Sweden. In 1968 refugees fled from Czechoslovakia. The following year Polish Jews were forced to leave Poland in a surge of anti-Semitism instigated by the authorities. When Solidarity was banned in 1981 another wave of Poles came to Sweden. There were great expectations throughout Europe that the end of the Cold War would bring lasting peace to the continent.

Unfortunately these hopes were thwarted by the tensions that built up in Yugoslavia and in the Caucasus. The break down of the Yugoslav federation resulted in a series of wars as Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia broke out of the federation. The Bosnian war generated a mass-flight situation embracing several hundreds of thousands of displaced persons. In numbers they exceeded all the previous waves of refugees from Eastern Europe after World War II. In Sweden the asylum seekers from the former Yugoslav republics amounted to 85,000 just for 1992. In 1992 visas were required of Albanians from Kosovo and in June 1993 visas were also required of Bosnians. The 40,000 Bosnian asylum seekers who at the time were waiting for a decision were permitted to stay in Sweden. These measures reduced the acute pressure of asylum seekers to Sweden, directing them to other countries. At this stage the Macedonians and the Albanians from Kosovo were not generally accepted as genuine refugees so their applications were mostly rejected. Things changed however with the Kosovo war in 1999. Whereas Sweden accepted more than 50,000 refugees from Bosnia during the Bosnian war 1992—96, only some 5,000 Albanians from Kosovo were accepted in 1999. When the hostilities had ceased and Serbian troops left the troubled province, a majority of the refugees in Sweden wanted to return. It is estimated that the 40,000 Bosnians will double as a result of family reunification.

The restrictive immigration policies that are being enforced in Sweden and other parts of Western Europe are primarily directed at Third World immigration. The concept of Fortress Europe is currently in vogue with analysts of international migration. One outcome of Maastricht is the opening up of Western Europe for internal migration but at the same time the closing of its gates to immigration from Eastern Europe and non-European countries.

2. Migratory patterns and socio-demographic trends

2.1 Stocks

Statistics Sweden and *the National Board of Immigration* are the principal suppliers of migration statistics. The former produces the overall demographic data whereas the latter provides data on the number of residence permits issued during the year. Various other sources will be used further on in this report. They will be validated and discussed in conjunction with sections where these data are referred to.

Table 1 shows stocks of the largest categories of *foreign born* residing permanently in Sweden on December 31, 1998. The category foreign born includes persons with foreign citizenship as well as those who have naturalized to Swedish citizenship. For obvious reasons it does not include persons of foreign citizenship who are born in Sweden. Looking back to the previous

Table 1. Stocks: Foreign born permanent residents in Sweden. Source: Statistics Sweden

Country of origin	1960	1970	1980	1990	1998
Estonia	21,000	18,513	15,331	11,971	10,512
(West) Germany	37,580	41,793	38,696	36,558	37,237
Italy	4,904	7,268	6,062	5,989	6,152
Finland	101,307	235,453	251,342	217,636	198,848
Norway	37,253	44,681	42,863	52,744	41,937
Denmark	35,112	39,152	43,501	43,931	38,187
USA	10,874	12,646	11,980	13,001	13,963
UK	2,738	5,378	8,243	11,378	13,666
Hungary	8,544	10,650	12,929	15,045	14,374
Poland	6,347	10,851	19,967	35,631	39,737
former Czechoslovakia	3,562	7,392	7,529	8,432	7,961
former Yugoslavia	1,532	33,779	37,982	43,346	127,554
Greece	266	11,835	15,153	13,171	11,154
Turkey	202	3,768	14,357	25,528	30,950
Chile	69	181	8,256	27,635	26,615
Iran	115	411	3,348	40,084	50,252
Iraq	16	108	631	10,528	37,902
India	361	907	4,452	9,054	10,608

Ethiopia	59	346	1,797	10,027	13,108
Somalia	-	68	146	725	12,498
Other countries	28,054	52,513	83,019	168,558	225,492
TOTAL	299,879	537,585	626,953	790,444	968,707

decades it is clear that the Estonian-born are decreasing at a constant rate. This is almost entirely due to death of old age. Sweden accepted approximately 30,000 Estonian refugees at the end of World War II. Those who were 25 years old in 1944 are 80 years old now. There was virtually no in-migration from Estonia throughout the entire Cold War. Children and grandchildren of the Estonian refugees seem to have maintained a sense of ethnic Estonian identity, but they don't show up in the statistics as Estonians. Needless to say, they are well integrated into Swedish society.

Similarly, the drop in the stock of Finnish migrants is partly due to death of old age, but also to some extent to the result of return migration which is due to labour market conditions. The same thing applies to the decrease for the Danish and Norwegian stocks. There are also drops for Hungarians, Czechs, Greeks and Chileans, in each case due to return migration. For all other groups there has been an increase since 1990, especially of communities from ex-Yugoslavia, Iran, Iraq and Somalia.

Tables 2 and 3 refer to the stocks of *foreign nationals* and *foreign born* persons for 1998. For 1998 there were more than 960,000 foreign born persons residing permanently in Sweden. Table 2 is organized by continents, and Table 3 gives the largest groups. Both tables also give the naturalization rates.

Overall the foreign-born population may be divided into three categories—Nordic (282,634), other European (319,684), and non European (366,389). Going back some years to the first part of the 1990s these foreign born have consisted of approximately equally many Nordics, other Europeans, and non Europeans. On the whole this is still a reasonably accurate assessment of the situation. However, there is a gradual change in the stocks. The Nordic share is slowly decreasing, partly, as we have seen, through out-migration, but partly also through death without much in-migration to replace those who have died. There is a slight increase in the stocks of other Europeans, mainly attributable to in-migration of EU nationals and to some

Table 2. Stocks: Foreign nationals and foreign born by continents; and naturalisation rate. 31 December 1998 Source: Statistics Sweden.

Continent	Foreign citizens 1998	Foreign born 1998	Percent foreign born	Naturalized Swedish citizens	Naturalisation rate 1998

Europe	326,095	602,318	62.2	276 233	0.46
<i>Nordic countries</i>	<i>159,717</i>	<i>282,634</i>	<i>29,2</i>	<i>122,917</i>	<i>0.43</i>
<i>Rest of Europe</i>	<i>166,378</i>	<i>319,684</i>	<i>33.0</i>	<i>153,306</i>	<i>0.48</i>
Africa	27,734	52,080	5.4	24,346	0.47
North America	14,747	23,122	2.4	8,375	0.36
South America	17,932	49,292	5.1	31,360	0.64
Asia	100,469	231,094	23.9	130,625	0.57
Oceania	2,112	2,659	0.3	547	0.21
Former Soviet Union	876	7,984	0.8	7,108	0.89
Stateless/unknown	9,966	158			
TOTAL	499,931	968,707	100	468,776	0.48

Table 3. Stocks: The largest groups of foreign nationals and foreign-born respectively; naturalisation rate. 31 December 1998. Source: Statistics Sweden.

Country of citizenship/birth	Foreign citizens	Foreign born	Naturalized	Naturalization rate 1998	Naturalization rate 1996
Lebanon	3,503	20,243	16,740	0.83	0.85
Ethiopia	2,894	13,108	10,214	0.78	0.67
Germany	15,124	37,237	22,113	0.59	0.61
Poland	15,925	39,737	23,812	0.60	0.60
FR Yugoslavia	35,042	77,567	42,525	0.55	0.47
Chile	11,376	26,615	15,239	0.57	0.53
Finland	99,902	198,848	98,946	0.50	0.49
Iran	19,793	50,252	30,459	0.61	0.45
Turkey	17,396	30,950	13,554	0.44	0.37
Denmark	24,962	38,187	13,225	0.35	0.34
USA	9,515	13,963	4,448	0.32	0.32
Norway	30,610	41,937	11,327	0.27	0.28
Iraq	26,600	37,902	11,302	0.30	0.21
UK	12,098	13,666	1,568	0.11	0.12
Somalia	13,450	12,498		0	0
B o s n i a - Herzegovina	44,461	49,987		0	0
All others	117,280	266,010	148,730	0.56	.52
TOTAL	499,931	968,707	468,776	0.48	0.44

extent to remaining family reunifications of the Bosnians. The stock of migrants of non-European origin is also increasing. The sending region is above all in the Middle East—Iraq, Iran and Turkey. Refugees escaping the destruction of the Bosnian state during the war 1992—96 overshadowed the migration from the Middle East. However, the migration from this region started long before the breakdown of Yugoslavia, it went on during the Bosnian war, and it will continue into the foreseeable future.

The Finns are by far the largest group of immigrants, and Finnish has recently been recognized as a national minority language in Sweden. The immigrants of (other) European origin consist of two categories—labour migrants (from the 1960s and early 1970s) and refugees. The most numerous group of labour migrants of non-Nordic origin were the Yugoslavs who came in the 1960s, encouraged by their government to seek employment abroad as a means of coping with the economic problems of the country. Greeks and Turks also joined the forces of labour migrants. The number of different groups was limited, a factor that had implications for the integration policies that eventually developed.

On the whole the average rate of naturalisation has changed very little in the past two years (table 3). Ethiopians, Iranians and Iraqis have increased their rates of naturalisation in comparison to the rates for 1996. Nordic citizens may acquire Swedish citizenship after two years of permanent residence as compared to five years for citizens of other countries. Still a substantial number of the Nordic citizens have chosen to maintain their original citizenship. They don't have all that much to gain from naturalization. Nordic citizens enjoy the rights of the common Nordic labour market. This means that they are automatically entitled to work permits and hence to residence permits. EU citizens also have the right to access the Swedish labour market. For all other foreign citizens the work permit is a condition for being granted residence, and work permits are issued very restrictively.

South Americans have a fairly high rate of naturalisation and so do migrants from the former Soviet Union. In both cases we are dealing with immigrants the majority of whom have been a good many years in Sweden. There has been an accumulation of persons who have naturalized. The amnesty issued by the Chilean government some years ago encouraged a number of Chilean émigrés to return to their native country, primarily those who have maintained their citizenship, not those who have adopted Swedish citizenship. The majority of those from the former Soviet Union came to Sweden during World War II as refugees, or after the war from UNHCR run camps as part of the annual quota that Sweden accepted. It is possible that some persons who have been regarded as born in the Soviet Union more correctly should be put down as being born in one of the Baltic states.

For Africans there is also an increase in the naturalisation rate. Mainly this is attributable to the fact that an increasing number of Africans now qualify for Swedish citizenship after having resided permanently in the country for at least five years. This comes out clearly in table 3. We see here a most significant increase in the naturalisation rate for the Ethiopians. There are of course a host of reasons that account for people's motives to adopt Swedish citizenship. In cases of mixed marriages some may see it as is rational to naturalize. For some it may serve the purpose of reinforcing a sense of security. Whatever the individual motive, it is usually

connected with an assessment that return to one's native country is no longer possible or desirable.

Table 3 also shows that the Iranians and Iraqis, two of the largest immigrant groups in Sweden, are increasing their rate of naturalisation. There was a large intake of Iranians for a number of years during the 1980s extending into the early 1990s. Today the influx of Iranians is going down. Those who came in the early 1990s are now eligible to adopt Swedish citizenship if they wish. Quite a large number of Iraqis, many of whom are ethnic Kurds, now also qualify for Swedish citizenship.

In a situation of relatively low immigration, it follows logically that *the rate of naturalisation* will increase as the population of foreign citizens ages, thus increasingly becoming eligible for naturalisation. Gradually a saturation will occur. It is highly unlikely that an entire immigrant population will chose to naturalize, unless there are special conditions that apply. The situation of migrants of Lebanese origin illustrates this point. To a large extent the Lebanese born are Palestinians and Syrian Christians, the latter sometimes referred to as the Assyrians. They have concentrated to the town of Södertälje south of Stockholm. They claim that there is no future for them in Lebanon or Turkey. Return is not possible. As a group they have been present in Sweden since the early 1970s. They have chosen to settle in Sweden, and for this reason many have also chosen to assume Swedish citizenship.

Should immigration increase it follows that the rate of naturalization will decrease because of the influx of foreign citizens who still have a number of years to qualify for Swedish citizenship. In table 3 this is obviously the case for Bosnians and Somalis. When out-migration occurs it would seem likely that a large proportion of those who have maintained their original citizenship than those who have adopted Swedish citizenship will move out. This would then imply a relative increase in the rate of naturalization. An empirical estimate of the general saturation level would be around 55%, all other things being equal.

2.2 Flows 1998

The total registered population of Sweden was 8,854,322 persons on December 31, 1998. This includes Swedish citizens as well as foreign citizens residing permanently in Sweden. The birth rate has decreased dramatically just over a few years. From being exceptionally high in the early 1990s it has dropped to its lowest level since 1809. The general birth rate (the number of births per 1,000 individuals) was 10.1 for 1998. For 1997 the number of deaths (93,278) exceeded the number of births (89,234) for the first time since 1809. Thus there is a natural decrease in the population. The slight increase of the total population that nevertheless is evident is entirely due to in-migration. Migration flows for Sweden are given in table 4 for the years 1996, 1997 and 1998.

The net migration to Sweden was just over six thousand for 1996 and 1997, but then increased to well over 10,000 for 1998. Return migration is changing the composition of the migrant stock. Sweden is losing to neighbouring Nordic countries. In the 1960s and early 1970s Sweden was way ahead of its neighbours economically and industry was in need of manpower. Today the situation is reversed. Sweden is lagging behind. Finns, Danes and Norwegians are returning to

their native countries and the better job opportunities there.

The data in table 4 show that out-migration has hardly changed at all between 1996 and 1998. The increase in the net flows is almost entirely due to increased in-migration. Out-migration to the Nordic countries, however, is now considerably larger than in-migration from these countries. One explanation for this is the still rather high level of unemployment for people of non-Swedish origin. The Danish and above all the Norwegian economies are currently considerably stronger than the Swedish one.

In-migration from the remainder of Europe is still significantly higher than out-migration to these countries. However, the same trend applies here. The gap between in-migration and out-migration is diminishing. Generally, in-migration is largely dominated by family reunifications in the wake of the Bosnian refugee crisis. In-migration to Sweden from Asia is essentially larger than out-migration. The situation has changed very little between 1996 and 1998. The over all net result is still a positive but considerably reduced migration gain.

The flows back and forth in relation to other European countries consist partly of movements of professionals, students and company officials within the European Union labour market, but mostly it consists of refugees from Bosnia, Macedonia, Croatia and Kosovo and family reunifications. Although some refugees are gradually returning to their home countries, family reunions in Sweden account for most of the movements to Sweden. In-migration from Europe (excluding the Nordic countries) is comparatively large, but so is return migration. Immigration from Asia, although increasing, is slightly lower than that for Europe, but so is also return migration, thus leading to a much higher net for Asia than for Europe.

Table 4. Migration flows 1996-1998. Source: Statistics Sweden

	1996			1997			1998		
	in	out	net	in	out	net	in	out	net
Nordic countries	8,082	12,074	-3,992	8,113	13,965	-5,852	9,854	14,242	-4,388
Rest of Europe	13,370	10,014	3,356	16,264	11,755	4,509	15,979	11,570	4,409
Africa	2,842	895	1,947	3,050	901	2,149	2,995	809	2,186
North America	3,325	4,030	-705	3,174	4,505	-1,331	3,627	4,540	-913
South America	1,614	1,080	534	1,681	1,116	565	1,696	1,011	685
Asia	10,003	3,270	6,733	11,881	3,459	8,422	14,027	3,248	10,779
Oceania	568	691	-123	536	669	-133	710	662	48
Unidentified	91	1,830	-1,739	119	2,173	-2,054	503	2,436	-1,933
TOTAL	39,895	33,884	6,011	44,818	38,543	6,275	49,391	38,518	10,873

2.3 Types of migration: refugees and family reunification

Table 5 gives the number of residence permits by categories issued to non-Nordic nationals for the period 1984 to 1998. There was a drastic reduction in the intake of refugees in 1995 and 1996 in relation to the numbers that had been accepted before that. Since then the refugee intake is gradually increasing again. The processing of asylum applications has become a very time consuming business since appeals are launched against practically every decision contrary to the interests of the applicant. The level of refugee immigration is now comparable to the volumes of the mid-1980s. In total numbers family reunification, however, remains at a fairly high level. About 55% of the new residence permits issued in 1998 were for reasons of family reunification. There is a delayed effect. Some years after a large intake of refugees, family reunifications will start to increase.

Labour migration from non EU/EEA countries is still insignificant, representing not more than 1% of the total immigration. However, there is a slight increase in the EU/EEA immigration as compared to previous years. The EEA treaty started to apply in Sweden in 1994 and Sweden joined the EU in 1995. This migration seems to have stabilized at around 5,000 persons annually. The number of foreign students has increased slightly whereas the number of adopted children from foreign countries on the whole has been fairly constant over the years. Overall there is a slight increase in the immigration for 1998 as compared to the figures for 1997. The types and kinds of migration has consequences for the ensuing process of integration.

Tables 6a and 6b refer to in-migration to and out-migration from Sweden in relation to the fourteen other EU member states. Table 6a gives the 1995 data and table 6b the 1998 data. There are some observations worth mentioning:

- a. With regard to the objectives of the EU, movements between Sweden and other EU member states are underdeveloped when compared to the volumes that apply to family reunification.
- b. For Sweden there is a net gain of foreign EU nationals (in-migration).
- c. There is a net loss of Swedish citizens (out-migration).

Table 5. Flows: Residence permits issued to non-Nordic nationals by categories 1984-1998.
Source: The National Board of Immigration

Year	Refugee	Family	Labour	Students	Adoptees	EU/EEA	TOTAL
1984	5,413 39%	6,561 47%	237 2%	509 4%	1,141 8%		13,861
1985	7,314 45%	6,944 43%	98 1%	478 3%	1,372 8%		16,206
1986	11,486 50%	9,670 42%	171 1%	646 2%	1,244 5%		23,035
1987	14,042 49%	12,387 43%	222 1%	678 2%	1,319 5%		28,648

1988	16,125 48%	15,093 45%	257 1%	855 3%	1,003 3%		33,333
1989	24,879 56%	18,029 40%	167 0%	821 2%	776 2%		44,672
1990	12,839 34%	22,221 59%	263 1%	1,143 3%	917 2%		37,383
1991	18,663 44%	21,230 50%	300 1%	969 2%	1,086 3%		42,248
1992	12,791 37%	19,662 56%	215 1%	1,233 4%	916 3%		34,817
1993	36,482 62%	19,796 34%	159 0%	1,611 3%	880 1%		58,928
1994	44,875 57%	25,975 33%	127 0%	1,086 1%	884 1%	6,040 8%	78,987
1995	5,642 17%	19,707 61%	190 1%	1,504 5%	794 2%	4,649 14%	32,486
1996	4,828 15%	18,816 59%	274 1%	1,771 6%	807 3%	5,164 16%	31,660
1997	9,596 26%	18,861 52%	433 1%	2,376 7%	694 2%	4,605 16%	36,565
1998	8,193 21%	21,598 55%	363 1%	2,665 7%	804 2%	5,810 15%	39,433

Table 6a. Flows 1995: In-migration and out-migration, EU member states to and from Sweden 1995. Source: The National Board of Immigration.

	Nationals from respective EU country			All, including Swedish citizens		
	to Sweden	from Sweden	net	to Sweden	from Sweden	net
	from	to		from	to	

Austria	42	34	8	158	192	-34
Belgium	50	20	30	468	444	24
Denmark	1,598	1,465	133	2,354	2,628	-274
Finland	2,772	2,640	132	3,165	3,439	-274
France	334	105	229	790	726	64
Germany	690	261	429	1,672	1,419	253
Greece	267	184	83	484	793	-309
Ireland	78	61	17	102	123	-21
Italy	181	77	104	429	440	-11
Luxembourg	0	0	0	47	120	-73
Netherlands	212	60	152	482	415	67
Portugal	60	25	35	147	155	-8
Spain	189	95	94	656	908	-252
UK	679	301	378	1 498	1,807	-309
TOTAL	7,152	5,328	1,824	12,452	13,609	-1,157

Table 6b. Flows 1998: In-migration and out-migration, EU member states to and from Sweden 1996. Source: Statistics Sweden.

	Nationals from respective EU country			All, including Swedish citizens		
	to Sweden from	from Sweden to	net	to Sweden from	from Sweden to	net
Austria	73	22	51	162	203	-41
Belgium	77	15	62	368	460	-92
Denmark	964	1,021	-57	1,927	2,445	-518
Finland	2,757	2,552	205	3,288	3,472	-184
France	499	146	353	972	888	84
Germany	1,023	333	690	2,217	1,492	725
Greece	187	170	17	389	720	-331
Ireland	81	39	42	168	205	-37
Italy	239	80	159	460	411	49
Luxembourg	1	1	0	56	162	-106
Netherlands	292	115	177	556	615	-59
Portugal	48	30	18	113	146	-33

Spain	245	109	136	728	997	-269
UK	778	360	418	2,008	3,119	-1,111
TOTAL	7,264	4,993	2,271	13,412	15,335	-1,923

- d. The loss of out-migrating Swedish citizens is larger than the gain of in-migrating other EU nationals.
- a. The pattern for 1998 is much the same as for 1995, but the above mentioned tendencies have been reinforced for 1998 as compared to 1995.
- f. The bulk of both the in-migration from and out-migration is concentrated to Denmark and Finland, the other two Nordic EU members. Germany and the UK are also fairly well represented

There is reason to project, however, that the movement of manpower within the EU affecting Sweden will tend to increase, although at a fairly moderate rate. There are structural differences in the populations of Nordic citizens, other Europeans, and non-Europeans. The median age for Nordic citizens is higher than that of citizens from the rest of Europe which in turn is higher than that of non-European citizens. The African immigrants have a low median age, which of course reflects the fact that their migration to Sweden is of a considerably later date than for instance the Nordic citizens, but it is also occasioned by the comparatively large number of children under ten years of age.

The total number of foreign citizens has gone down somewhat. This reduction reflects the increase of return migration especially of Nordic citizens, a fairly constant loss of foreign citizens who have adopted Swedish citizenship, and finally a reduced in-migration. North-west Europeans represent the most aged foreign citizens, for whom the median age is around 40. The bulk of their in-migration took place during the 1960s and early 1970s within labour migration schemes. Chileans, Iranians and Poles represented the main in-migrating refugee groups during the 1980s. Their median age is 34.

The refugees from the 1990s from former Yugoslavia and Iraq represent young age structures. It is surprising that migrants from Turkey on the whole are as young as they are in view of the fact that migration from Turkey has been going on since the 1960s. In many cases Turkish labourers who came during the 1960s have returned to their native country upon retirement. Another explanation is that a large number of Turkish citizens are not ethnic Turks but rather fairly recent refugees from Kurdistan.

2.4 Demographic aspects: children of international migrants

The term "second generation migrants" is found in the migration literature. While it obviously refers to children of international migrants it seems logically and ethically wrong to categorize these children as migrants if they are born in the country to which their parents immigrated, in this case Sweden, many of them being citizens of the country. I shall use a concept developed within the EFFNATIS project and speak about children of international migrants—CIM for short.

Table 7 gives data on the stocks of foreign born and CIM for the Nordic countries, the rest of Europe, and the rest of the world for 1995 and 1998. The table also gives data on the most important sending countries. It may not immediately be clear what this table shows. First of all we see that there are considerable differences in the proportion of foreign born and CIMs in the three major categories (foreign born from Nordic states, the rest-of-Europe, and the rest-of-the-world). The CIMs of Nordic origin are more numerous than their parents' generation, making up 57 percent of the Nordic group. For the 'rest-of-Europe' category the CIM

Table 7. Stocks: Foreign born (FB) and children of international migrants (CIM). 31 December 1998. Source: Statistics Sweden. For comparison data for 1995 are also given.

Country of origin	1995			1998		
	FB	CIM	Total	FB	CIM	Total
NORDIC STATES	295,406 <i>45.6%</i>	352,124 <i>54.4%</i>	647,530 <i>100%</i>	282,634 <i>43.2%</i>	372,211 <i>56.8%</i>	654,845 <i>100%</i>
REST OF EUROPE	314,982 <i>58.9%</i>	219,414 <i>41.1%</i>	534,396 <i>100%</i>	319,684 <i>56.9%</i>	242,130 <i>43.1%</i>	561,814 <i>100%</i>
REST OF WORLD	325,630 <i>72.7%</i>	122,498 <i>27.3%</i>	448,128 <i>100%</i>	366,389 <i>69.1%</i>	163,873 <i>30.9%</i>	530,262 <i>100%</i>
GRAND TOTAL	936,018 <i>57.4%</i>	694,036 <i>42.6%</i>	1,630,054 <i>100%</i>	968,707 <i>55.5%</i>	778,214 <i>44.5%</i>	1,746,921 <i>100%</i>
Denmark	40,506	53,101	93,607	38,187	56,924	95,111
Finland	205,710	237,240	442,950	198,848	247,326	446,174
Iceland	4,338	2,123	6,461	3,662	2,366	6,028
Norway	44,852	62,873	107,725	41,937	68,966	110,903
Bosnia-Herzegovina	45,602	2,300	47,902	49,9879	6,663	56,650
Estonia	11,182	15,286	26,468	10,512	15,686	26,198
Germany	35,731	50,186	85,917	37,237	53,987	91,224
Hungary	14,692	12,937	27,629	14,374	13,360	27,734
Poland	39,404	24,095	63,499	39,737	26,159	65,896
UK	12,738	12,379	25,117	13,666	14,335	28,001
Yugoslavia	70,516	36,725	107,241	70,870	42,256	113,132
Chile	26,979	11,139	38,118	26,615	13,376	39,991

Ethiopia	13,436	4,696	18,132	13,108	6,728	19,836
Iran	49,040	11,576	60,616	50,252	14,795	65,047
Iraq	26,361	7,253	33,614	37,902	11,420	49,322
Lebanon	21,555	10,911	32,466	20,243	13,987	34,230
Somalia	10,377	2,521	12,898	12,498	5,328	17,826
Turkey	29,761	22,103	51,864	30,950	25,39	56,689

represent 43 percent of this population, and for the ‘rest-of-the-world’ category the proportion of CIM is even smaller (31 percent). The relative proportions are approximately the same as for 1995. However, for all categories the proportion of CIM is slowly increasing when compared to the data for 1995. A scenario where in-migration is reduced to a minimum there will still be a natural increase in the proportion of the CIM for a number of years.

Looking at the total numbers we find that the foreign born from the Nordic countries are decreasing. This decrease is smaller than the increase of the CIM, thus resulting in a slight increase of the total population of Nordic origin residing in Sweden. For the ‘rest-of-Europe’ category there is an increase both for migrants and CIM giving rise to a moderate overall increase for this category of residents. Finally, for the ‘rest-of-the-world’ category there is a fairly large increase of both the foreign born and CIM, resulting then in a fairly large increase of the total population of this category.

The table also gives data on the most important countries of origin. With regard to the individual Nordic countries of origin, the tendency is a decrease of the foreign born and an increase of the CIM, thus giving rise to a moderate increase of the number of persons of Nordic origin residing in Sweden.

For the ‘rest-of-Europe’ category we find a reduction in the total numbers of foreign born and CIM for Estonia. This decrease is almost entirely attributable to ageing and death without any new intakes to replace those who have died of old age. Quite a few of the Estonian CIM are by now grandparents themselves, which means that children of Estonian ancestry that are born today represent the fourth generation Estonians in Sweden.

The Estonians represent a special case. They were the first comparatively large non-Nordic immigrant group in modern times to settle in Sweden on a permanent basis. There is reason to believe that we will see a similar development for some of the groups that came to Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s. For the Germans and Hungarians there is a slight reduction in the number of foreign born, partly through death but also through return migration in conjunction with retirement. For other European groups there is an increase in the numbers of both foreign born and CIM. In view of the age structure of the Bosnians and Yugoslavs it is hardly surprising to find a fairly large relative increase of the CIM. The large increase for the CIM from the UK is harder to explain.

For the 'rest-of-the-world' category there is a similar trend. The Iraqis show the largest increase of all groups in 1998.

3. From immigration to integration policies

3.1 Controlling immigration

The control of immigration to Sweden has gone through various phases corresponding to the stages of immigration outlined in chapter 1, but with a delay of several years. Before World War II immigration was strictly controlled. As mentioned earlier, Jewish refugees from Germany were rejected, and during the early stages of the war even Norwegian refugees were turned back at the border. This didn't prevent others from coming in unofficially. Control was strict because Sweden's principal objective was to stay clear of German occupation, but in terms of my hypothesis basically it may also be seen as a continuation of pre-war policies.

By the time it was clear that Germany was on the losing side the borders opened up to refugees from surrounding countries. Because Sweden managed to keep out of the war, domestic industry, transport facilities and general infrastructure were intact when peace was restored in 1945. Swedish industry had a great advantage during the early post-war years. The reconstruction of Europe put Swedish industry in the fore-front of international trade and commerce. Industrial products such as ball-bearings, drills, engines and trucks were in demand, resulting in an upswing for industry which in turn led to manpower shortages. Skilled workers were recruited from Italy, and subsequently from other Mediterranean countries, as well as from Finland. The years of unparalleled economic growth continued until the early 1970s. During most of this period Sweden actually practised a policy of free immigration of labour. The borders were open and there was little control of migrants. Nobody cared. An immigrant from Belgrade could catch the train to Göteborg and apply for a job the very same day s/he arrived. Work would start the following day. No vocational training, no language courses. This went on for more or less twenty years. Immigrants were integrated into society by participating in the work force. This long period of free entry was in terms of the hypothesis an extension of the opening up of the borders for refugees at the end of the war.

In the mid-1960s, however, immigration started to become an issue. Leading politicians thought that increasing cultural diversity in Swedish society could result in a situation resembling racial inequality and civil unrest in the USA. The hot summers in the Newark, Detroit and Watts ghettos, Martin Luther King and the civil rights movement, impressed many Swedes. What could be done to avoid the build-up of ethnic tension? An almost instinctive response from the political establishment was to reject a guest worker policy of the kind practiced in Germany and Switzerland. Immigrants in Sweden were to enjoy the same basic social and economic rights as Swedes. Developing an "immigrant" policy, as it was termed, required a tightening up of immigration control. A first step on the road to more rigorous control was taken in 1967. An end was put to spontaneous in-migration by demanding a work-permit before one was allowed to enter the country. This work permit would be issued by the Swedish embassy in the country of emigration when the prospective migrant could show that s/he had a job going. Companies could still recruit manpower, but people could no longer just show up at the factory gates and expect to get a job.

Post-war labour immigration culminated in 1969 and 1970. In 1972, however, all manpower immigration from non-Nordic countries was stopped effectively. This was the outcome of a recommendation from the LO (the Labour Organization of Sweden) which had close ties to the

Social Democratic government. A similar closing of the labour market gate was enforced more or less simultaneously in all western Europe. Sweden had to follow suit. Refugees and asylum seekers were not affected by this decision, however. They were not an issue in the days of labour migration because numbers were small—mostly individuals who had managed to escape from the other side of the iron curtain, and the few hundred that Sweden had pledged to accept from UNHCR camps. Refugees were treated and seen as part of the general labour migration. Neither was illegal or undocumented migration an issue up until 1967. But once the authorities started to look into who was coming to the country, new instruments of control had to be devised. Throughout most of the 1970s a growing number of refugees were accepted on humanitarian grounds that had applied in earlier post-war years. It was labour migrants that were stopped, not refugees.

A first step in redefining this policy was taken in the late 1970s. The individual grounds for asylum that were presented were examined more closely. A novel approach was to categorize the reasons for seeking asylum into "A" and "B" grounds. "A" grounds qualified for asylum according to the Geneva conventions, "B" grounds were accepted out of humanitarian considerations. The Assyrians were regarded as "B" refugees and were denied residence in Sweden at one stage. Later the term *de facto* refugees was introduced for the latter category. Every attempt to limit the right to asylum led to loud protests from the intellectual establishment. The decision in December 1989 to reduce the intake of refugees (mentioned in chapter 1) had dramatic and unexpected consequences. An effective way to prevent asylum seekers from entering the country was to require visas, a policy adopted in 1993 for Bosnians. Another strategy was to abandon the idea of *permanent* residence, a last remnant of the labour migration policy from the 1950s and 1960s, for *temporary* residence permits. The current policy is to repatriate refugees as soon as possible.

The stepwise tightening up of immigration to Sweden over the past thirty years has a parallel in the attempts to formulate and implement an "immigrant", and later an integration policy. From a stage of virtually non-existent immigration control and integration policy we have arrived at a situation which is characterized by a tight control of immigration and ambitious programmes for integration. How has the Swedish welfare state approached the issue of integrating its immigrant population?

3.2 The three pillars of an integration policy

It was not until the end of the 1960s that authorities and opinion moulders started to define Sweden as a country of immigration. In 1968 a Commission on Immigration was appointed. First of all it had to solve a number of instrumental questions concerning such things as the training and qualification of interpreters and teachers of language courses in basic Swedish for recently arrived immigrants. The National Board of Immigration was set up in 1969. It was to deal with questions relating to immigration control, citizenship, and the adjustment of immigrants to Swedish society (through the dissemination of information and public opinion moulding).

In 1974 the Commission presented its recommendations that were a radical break with the traditional unreflected policy of assimilation. The contents of the new policy were condensed in

terms of three slogans: *equality*, *freedom of choice* and *partnership*. Obviously the Commission was influenced by the *Zeitgeist* of the early seventies in the aftermath of the student uprisings. Questions of racism, discrimination and minority rights were questions raised by students and young intellectuals. This new "immigrant and minority" policy was a response to and an acceptance of the fact that Sweden was turning into a multicultural society. Cultural pluralism, it was argued, is what the future has in store.

It is now twenty years since Widgren (1980) published his book on Swedish "immigrant" policy, and fifteen years since Hammar's (1985) internationally acclaimed analysis was presented. Both works give a rather favourable and optimistic view of Sweden's possibilities to integrate its immigrants within the framework of a pluralistic society. Both analyses seem inspired by a sense of confidence in the new "immigrant" policies. Hammar has published extensively on Swedish immigration and immigrant policy since the 1985 book. In his later pieces his views have been modified considerably. The essence of the three slogans has been discussed in a more critical vein by some other writers, among them Kaminsky and Westin (1985) and Ålund and Schierup (1991).

The slogan *equality* reflects a most fundamental tenet and guiding principle of the Swedish model and welfare state. The application of equality in the context of immigration was a rejection of the guest worker system. Immigrant workers were to enjoy the same social and economic rights as Swedes. They were permitted to bring their families to Sweden. This right has never been questioned.

The slogan *freedom of choice*, like equality, echoes the liberal tradition of ideas originating in the French Revolution. The basic idea is that *individuals* determine their personal cultural affiliation and identity, not collectives, organizations or ethnic groups. As it were, this goal was a rejection of forced and uncompromising assimilation of individuals.

The slogan of *partnership* is perhaps the most difficult to comprehend. Hammar (1985) regards it as an application of the two others to political life. Immigrants and minority groups are seen as partners in the development of society. Not only are they granted the freedom of association but also public support to maintain their associations. On the other hand, Widgren (1980), who was head secretary of the Commission on Immigration and who actually came up with the slogans, states that partnership really was meant to express the need for mutual tolerance and solidarity between immigrants and native Swedes. The goal may be understood as a rejection of social exclusion, racism and discrimination on ethnic and racial grounds.

3.3 General welfare policy—equality

The main instrument to ensure *equality* was, and still is, general welfare policy in its many facets—health care, social benefits, day nurseries, free education in comprehensive schools and access to higher education on merits and qualifications, council housing, a reasonably just pension system and labour market policies. The labour market is a key arena when it comes to integration. This is where migrants and natives of the host country meet, interact and develop mutual interdependence. A basic tenet is that work inspires values such as dignity, independence

and solidarity. Thus, work has always served as the principal instrument to achieve social integration in the Sweden. Immigrants who are permanent residents are recognized as enjoying the same rights and obligations as Swedish citizens with regard to their participation in the labour market. Starting in the 1930s Sweden had built up an efficient organization for dealing with labour market problems. The National Board of Labour is an impressive organization with branches in every county, and running Labour Market Exchanges in every town and municipality. The National Board also runs a large number of vocational retraining centres all over the country. Immigrants have access to these courses on the same conditions as to Swedes.

Despite major efforts of the authorities to ensure equal rights in the labour market, reports of ethnic and racial discrimination at various work-places have frequently surfaced. The Commission on Ethnic Discrimination and Prejudice in 1985, and the Commission on Racism and Xenophobia in 1988, recommended that law be passed against ethnic and racial discrimination in the labour market. A succession of different governments were all reluctant to do so with reference to a traditional policy of non-interference in labour market affairs. Discrimination was something that the parties of the labour market themselves are expected to solve. However, a coalition of Conservatives, Liberals, Centre Party and Christian Democrats (1991—94) passed a law prohibiting ethnic and racial labour market discrimination, a law which unfortunately proved to be toothless.

In other domains of social life, general public policies have also been utilized to ensure the goal of equality, as in health care, social welfare, housing and education. Hammar (1985) mentions housing as an instructive example of general social policies. Immigrants are provided with housing of the same general standard as Swedes. The tendency for immigrants to settle together in certain neighbourhoods is not a result of any conscious direct policy but rather of the desire of some immigrants to reside together with their countrymen, he states. Today it has become clear that segregation in the housing market has a more complex aetiology with roots in intergroup processes involving discrimination and social exclusion.

Since Hammar published his analysis in 1985 refugee immigration has grown from countries and cultures that in many respects differ most distinctly from Swedish ways of life. It is true that neighbourhoods with a predominantly immigrant population are not as run down in a sheer material sense as ghettos in many major European cities. But problems are brewing. The economic problems that Swedish society has faced in the early 1990s downturn (high unemployment rates, a large budget deficit etc.) struck the immigrant population harder than Swedes.

Gender equality is a central norm in Swedish political life and it is broadly accepted in society. In consideration of the fact that women were given the right to vote in 1921 and that there are still differences in mean salaries for men and women employed for the same jobs, there is still ground to cover. For migrant families coming from traditional and patriarchal societies gender equality has implied opportunities for women to educate themselves, to work and become economically independent of their husbands, fathers and brothers. Some men who cherish patriarchal ideals have lost out on gender equality. A number of cases are reported in which young girls of immigrant origin have been beaten by brothers, in a few cases even murdered, because these girls have associated freely with Swedish peers. These cases point to the fact that

equality, although essential to integration, can also be problematic because of other core values relating to gender and generational roles.

3.4 Specific or targeted policies—freedom of choice

Whereas equality was to be ensured by employing general social policies, the goal of *freedom of choice* was to be achieved by instruments that were specifically oriented to the needs of the immigrant population. One important instrument that was employed was the system of home language (or mother tongue) training that children of international migrants have the right to, provided, of course, that there are a sufficient number of pupils to organize home language classes. Mother tongue instruction was also given to immigrant children in day care nurseries. During the days of labour migration, and the years immediately following, this was rarely a problem because the majority of the immigrant children belonged to a few major ethnic and linguistic groups—Finns, Greeks, Turks and Serbo-Croatian speakers. Moreover, most of the labour immigrants were concentrated to the major industrial cities in Sweden.

A heated debate arose in the early 1980s about the organization of mother tongue instruction. Spokesmen for the Finnish migrants in Sweden, supported by academics and media in Finland, demanded that children of Finnish descent should be entitled to attend classes in which the language of instruction is Finnish. This was the equivalent of demanding separate Finnish schools. Some Swedish academics warned that the future consequences might well be a segregation of the population. Both sides agreed about the goal of bilingualism, but they disagreed on how to achieve it. The demands made by the powerful Finnish immigrant organizations impressed other immigrant groups who then sided with the Finns.

This created a dilemma for the Social Democrats who were in favour of comprehensive schools open to all social (and ethnic) categories, and who traditionally were opposed to private schools—sectarian, ethnic or based in social class. The Social Democrats were unwilling to assign public funding to ethnic schools. Education, then, was a domain in which a general policy aimed at equality clashed with specific immigrant demands for separate schools in the name of freedom of choice.

By the early 1990s the situation had changed considerably as compared to the mid-1970s. Diversity had increased (many more language groups) and dispersal was the solution to initial integration (newcomers were no longer concentrated only to the major industrial cities). Sometimes it was difficult to organize home language instruction, because there might be too few pupils. Finding qualified teachers could also prove to be a problem. The deteriorating economy in the early 1990s was remedied by cuts in public expenditures, inevitably affecting educational programmes. Mother tongue classes have suffered some of the most far reaching cuts.

The future for mother tongue instruction programmes within the regular school system is questioned today. The general attitude to cultural pluralism is less compromising than it used to be. Today it is seen as absolutely essential for these children of international migrants, born and raised in Sweden, to receive qualified training in Swedish. They should not miss instruction in Swedish for home-language classes. Instruction in the mother tongue may have been instrumental

to children of the labour immigrants some twenty-five years ago but for later arrivals it hasn't served this purpose. Segregation in housing and discrimination on the labour market, as well as increasingly hostile views to immigrants now voiced by many young Swedes, have blocked the option for many children of international migrants to assume a Swedish cultural identity. Targeted policies aimed to support the objective of freedom of choice are not a first priority with local governments. They tend to be too costly.

The mother-tongue instruction programme in the schools was a product of good intentions. Looking critically at the programme with the benefit of hindsight, one might well recognize certain elements of repressive tolerance at work. The teachers engaged in the home language classes were never incorporated on equal terms into the staff at the schools in which they taught. The home language teachers were outsiders. Their skills and merits as teachers were never fully recognized. There were no real career opportunities available to them. Consequently, neither was there any development of educational methods or instructional practices.

The coalition government 1991—94, spurred on by the Conservative Party, made public funding available to private schools. Several Finnish speaking schools have started since then. The home-language issue was, and still is, basically a question with its roots in the long historical relationship between Sweden and Finland.

3.5 Integration policies—partnership

There were two important instruments employed to achieve the goal of *partnership*: Support of immigrant organizations, and extension of political rights to immigrants. Both of these instruments may be seen as extrapolations from the experiences that were made by the pioneering Social Democrats, not only during the forty years during which they were in power uninterrupted, but even more importantly during the forty preceding years when the party established its leading role for Sweden's working classes.

The Swedish labour movement—the Social Democratic Labour Party and the Labour Organization—has successfully monitored the transition of Sweden from an impoverished rural society into a modern welfare state. Class differences are not entirely eliminated, but they are less obvious in Sweden than in most other European nations. At the end of the nineteenth century Sweden was still one of the impoverished countries of Europe. Today wide spread poverty is abolished. The vehicles of the labour movement were a number of popular movements of interest, acting in concert to abolish social injustice. The trade unions were the most obvious example. Similar movements developed to defend the interests of tenants, old age-pensioners, women and consumers (the co-operative movement). The sports movement was one that attracted many young people. In more or less every town and village the People's Park and the People's House were founded and constructed by workers dedicated to the movement. The People's House was a natural centre for study groups, debates and political discussion as well as for cultural events. An important branch of the labour movement was the Worker's Educational Association.

All these accomplishments were achieved by the pioneers themselves without any financial

support from public means. It was a compelling example of functioning democracy at the grass roots level. In other words, the labour movement developed as a web of organizations, horizontally located in the sense of centring upon interests in different domains of social life, but structured hierarchically. In the early days there was a definite two way interaction between the top of the pyramid and its base. Ever since these pioneering days a strong sense of organizational culture is found in Sweden. Democratic ideals are venerated. The web of interest organizations, permeating the entire labour movement, proved to be an efficient means of integrating the working classes into mainstream society. The foundations were laid by the Social Democratic leaders Hjalmar Branting and Per Albin Hansson. The fruits were reaped during the long era of Tage Erlander's leadership (prime minister 1946—69).

These fundamental experiences must have come to mind when the question arose as how to integrate the immigrant population into mainstream society. Thus authorities encouraged immigrants to organize themselves, to establish local as well as national organizations. Many immigrant groups were quick to respond. The National Association of Finnish Organizations has by far been the most powerful and influential of its kind, due to its large membership cadre. At the time when this model of integration was adopted, the pioneering spirit of the Swedish labour organizations was a thing of the past. The organizational structures remained but much of the spirit and commitment had faded away as the general standard of living rose.

A more critical analysis of the role played by the interest organizations would point to how the evolution of these national organizations has brought about an increasing distance between the top and the grass roots. It would point to how the democratic web of organizations has turned more rigid, in effect becoming part of the very structure of a state corporatism. Important policy decisions are not necessarily made in Parliament but in negotiations between parties and interest organizations.

In order to receive financial support from public means the immigrant organizations were required to adopt clauses pertaining to democratic methods of work. These clauses were based upon the experiences and traditions of the labour movement pioneers. To qualify for public support an organization must have an accepted set of statutes that prescribes how to deal with various situations that might arise, membership must be open to all, the governing committee must be freely elected etc. These requirements as to how the organization must operate in order to be eligible for public funding were alien to many immigrants for cultural reasons. The organizational infrastructure that had developed during the struggle to improve living conditions in Sweden early in the century could not be supplanted just like that to the type of organizations that immigrants from Yugoslavia, Turkey, Poland, Chile or Iran, to mention some of the large immigrant minorities, favoured.

The inevitable outcome was that the immigrant organizations became top heavy. They were governed from the top by people who were willing to accept the Swedish conditions. There was no wide spread sense of commitment to the cause at the grass roots level. With the exception of the Finnish organizations, immigrant organizations in Sweden have not played the part that was expected of them. They exist to safeguard the interests of their members, but they have not been able to play any essential role in the development of Swedish multicultural society. In a sense these organizations are hostages of the state (Ålund & Schierup 1991).

3.6 Into the polity—citizenship, denizenship and voice

The other essential means to guarantee the goal of partnership was to extend political rights to immigrants of foreign nationality, and also to facilitate naturalisation of citizenship. On these issues Hammar has written extensively and I do not intend to reiterate his well stated position. Swedish citizenship follows the *ius sanguinis* principle. This means that children acquire the citizenship of their parents. Being born in Sweden does not automatically entitle one to Swedish citizenship (the *ius soli* principle). Sweden has however regarded naturalization as an important instrument for integration and has encouraged permanently residing immigrants to naturalize. For non-Nordic citizens five years of permanent residence is required, for Nordic citizens, two years. There are no language or knowledge tests, but there is a good-conduct clause. Foreign citizens who have been sentenced to prison for a criminal offence are not accepted.

Being *Swedish* refers both to an ethnic identity (language, culture) and a civic identity (citizenship). Sweden is a good example of a nation state which in language and with people in general doesn't clearly differentiate between ethnic and civic identity. This is due to the relative ethnic homogeneity during the nineteenth century nation building processes. A challenge for modern society is to work out how the civic identity of being Swedish—being a Swedish citizen—may be made compatible with identities that are not culturally or ethnically Swedish. One of Hammar's observations was that many immigrants to Sweden preferred *not* to naturalize to Swedish citizenship despite the relative ease in doing so. Hammar introduced the term *denizens* to refer to foreign citizens living permanently in a country of immigration. Denizens in Sweden enjoy the same social, economic and educational rights as Swedish citizens. They contribute to the common good as tax-payers. Therefore it was seen as natural to extend the franchise even to denizens.

So in 1976 the right to vote in municipal and county elections was extended to permanent residents of non-Swedish citizenship. The reform was discussed but it didn't stir up much debate. In the election held that year 63 percent of the denizen electorate voted, as compared to well over 85 percent of the Swedish citizens. In recent years the denizen vote has dropped to below 50 percent, whereas Swedish participation is about 80 percent.

In the early 1980s there was talk about extending the rights of denizens so as to also include parliamentary elections. The argument was that denizens permanently resident in Sweden contribute substantially to Swedish society as tax-payers. For emotional reasons they could not be expected to renounce the citizenship of their country of origin. This proposal never materialized. First, the argument was patronizing. Secondly, if full political rights could be attained by foreign nationals, persons who were not eligible to military conscription, this would in effect be the equivalent of a devaluation of Swedish citizenship. The outcome of this debate was that Sweden has had to accept dual nationality. The rate of naturalization has increased slightly over the past years. It is believed that voting among naturalized Swedish citizens tends to approach that of native Swedes.

The representation of foreign born persons holding Swedish citizenship among the elected members of Parliament is far below their proportion of the general population. Neither do issues

relating to integration policies play any essential part in parliamentary debates. It is more than twenty-five years since the goal of partnership was specified. In recent years racist violence has increased substantially, creating fear among many categories of immigrants about what the future has in store for them. Increasing segregation and high rates of unemployment among the immigrants are hardly indications that Swedish society has moved any closer towards true partnership over these past twenty-five years.

4. The politics of exclusion

4.1 An overview of general attitudes, stereotypes and prejudices

Immigration, integration and the future of Swedish multicultural policies have been debated intensely over the years. What then has been the response to fifty years of immigration? During the first twenty years there was hardly any response at all. On the whole, immigrants were accepted because they were wanted in the labour market. No specific immigrant or minority policy existed. Neither were there any reliable opinion polls dealing with people's views on immigration. Later studies indicate that apprehension probably did exist about the rate of immigration. Quite likely many Swedes felt immigration was a threat to traditional Swedish values. However, those kinds of ideas didn't surface in public debate during the 1950s because of the powerful taboo on expressing xenophobic sentiments, which in turn was a direct reaction to the unearthing of the Nazi atrocities against the Jews and Slavic people that took place during World War II.

Various retrospective studies suggest that the early labour immigrants adapted fairly well and gradually became accepted in the cities in which they settled. They settled mainly in Sweden's major cities and in a limited number of leading industrial towns. Around the mid-1960s the authorities were concerned about potential conflicts between Swedes and immigrants, possibly escalating into serious social problems. Troubles of this kind were reported from Western Germany, UK, France and the Netherlands.

One of the first projects in the field of Swedish immigration research, carried out in 1969, was a survey of attitudes to immigrants based on a national sample (Trankell 1974). Unfortunately the final analysis was not published until five years later. Thus, the information provided by this study did not affect public debate for several years. Moreover, by the time the results were publicized, the nature of immigration to Sweden had changed as compared to the situation at the time of the data collection. This delay implied that there was no immediate interest in the mid-1970s to replicate the study.

Five background variables were found to correlate with the attitude variables. Education and social class were the most significant ones. Negative attitudes were prevalent among people with little formal education and among the working class. A negative attitude toward immigrants was also common among older people, among Swedes who had little contact with immigrants, and among people with little personal experience of other countries.

In the late 1970s the mass-media called attention to fights between Swedish and Assyrian youths and discrimination against blacks at restaurants. These incidents were perceived as indications of growing tension between Swedes and immigrants. In 1978 the government appointed a Commission on Ethnic Prejudice and Discrimination to review the existing legislation in this field. The Commission also sponsored a new survey of public attitudes toward immigrants. A series of 17 attitude items from the 1969 survey were administered to respondents in national samples in 1981 and then again in 1987 and 1993, as well as in a youth survey in 1990.

The second survey confirmed the findings from 1969 (Westin 1982, 1984). Negative attitudes

toward immigrants were more prevalent in the working class and among people with little formal education. Negative attitudes were more widespread in rural areas than in major cities. Age was a particularly significant factor. Young people held an accepting attitude whereas elderly people did not. Contrary to all expectations, however, the study proved that Swedes had become a lot more positive in their attitude toward immigrants than in 1969. Similar results were found in Denmark and Finland (Körmendi 1986, Jaakola 1989). How could this be? How could insightful observers seriously misjudge public opinion?

During the 1970s, conditions were favourable for the emergence of a tolerant public opinion. Because of the 1972 ban on continued manpower immigration from non-Nordic countries, the recessions of the 1970s failed to stir up hostility toward foreign workers. People grew increasingly aware of the importance of immigrant issues. This awareness resulted in greater ethnic tolerance and, at the same time, greater vigilance against racist tendencies. A paradoxical effect of this vigilance against racism was that a majority of the respondents felt that ethnic and race relations in Sweden had deteriorated considerably since the mid-1970s.

The shift of opinion was primarily due to the youngest cohort included in the 1981 study replacing the oldest cohort in the 1969 study. Thus, the correlation between people's age and their attitude toward immigrants actually reflected social developments since the early twentieth century. In theory socialisation to fundamental belief and value systems takes place in people's youth. Generally they are loyal to their ideals later in life. The oldest—and most intolerant—cohort 1969 came of age when Sweden was a country of emigration, when universal suffrage still lay in the future, and when concepts of Nordic racial superiority were being disseminated. The youngest—and most tolerant—cohort 1981 grew up in a multicultural society. Many of the young respondents had immigrants as classmates. Why did the public, the authorities and the immigrants themselves assume that relations between Swedes and immigrants had deteriorated?

One explanation is that people's growing awareness of immigrant issues contributed to the way in which information on ethnic relations was selected at different levels. Social service agencies, for instance, come into contact with the seamy side of ethnic relations, conflicts, prejudices against immigrants, discrimination etc. Their task is to resolve these problems if possible. It lies in their professional interest to emphasize the importance of their own work. On the other hand, these agencies have no occupational reason to call attention to aspects of ethnic relations that work smoothly. The information that moves up the administrative hierarchies is selected in this way. The same is true of the immigrant organizations. They must react when their own members are mistreated in Sweden, but not when relations between Swedes and immigrants are working as they should.

This information selection process was even more obvious in the mass media. Among the tasks of the media is monitoring social problems. When racist tendencies emerge they are given a prominent place in news reports. On the other hand, when Swedes and immigrants are on good terms with each other at workplaces, in schools and in neighbourhoods, this normally has no news value. People whose main source of information on ethnic relations is the media—people living in rural areas and the elderly—thus get a skewed picture of actual conditions. Young

people living amidst the multicultural impulses of major cities generally have a more subtle understanding of immigrants, based on their own direct experiences. The media thus help to build up an image of conflicts. One example of this was that journalists showed a striking lack of interest in the findings of the 1981 study, once it became known that public opinion had shifted in a more tolerant direction.

By the mid-1980s, racism was back at the centre of public discourse. In 1986 an Ombudsman Against Ethnic Discrimination was appointed to put more teeth into existing legislation in this field. The cabinet minister then responsible for immigrant policy made the struggle against racism his main issue. A follow-up attitude survey in 1987 (Westin 1987) nevertheless showed that public opinion had not swung in a negative direction. Shifts had occurred between the age categories, however. The oldest cohort 1987 still was most critical about immigrants, but the youngest cohort no longer represented the most positive attitude.

Responsibility for settling refugees in Sweden shifted in 1985 from the National Labour Market Board to the National Board of Immigration. The practical responsibility for integrating refugees into the mainstream of Swedish life was delegated to the municipal governments. Through negotiations with the Board of Immigration, each municipality had an annual quota of refugees with approved residence permits, who settled there and received housing, social services, training etc. One purpose of this system was to ease the burden on Stockholm, Göteborg and Malmö where housing shortages were a problem. Another purpose was to create better opportunities for contacts between Swedes and immigrants by dispersing them more evenly throughout the country. Nearly all municipalities have accepted refugees. However, in a controversial 1988 local referendum, the Municipality of Sjöbo in southern Sweden emphatically refused to receive refugees. A few other municipalities followed Sjöbo's example. The referendum in Sjöbo fuelled a renewed debate on racism.

Towards the end of the 1980s there was a considerable increase in the number of asylum seekers to Sweden. This was due to the political instability in the Middle East and North-East Africa. Asylum-seekers were coming from Iran, Iraq and Turkey as well as from Eritrea, Ethiopia and Somalia. But there were also increasing numbers of asylum-seekers from the Balkan countries. In recent years more than 100,000 have come from former Yugoslavia.

In the spring of 1990, shortly after the 1989 change of policy with regard to asylum applications, several refugee reception centres were bombed. Fortunately, not many people were hurt, but there was substantial material destruction. The attacks have continued since then. Jewish cemeteries in a number of cities have been desecrated. A mosque in the town of Trollhättan was destroyed by arson in 1993. Shops and coffeehouses owned by persons of non-Swedish origin have been targeted as well.

Many people believe that these attacks, like the shooting of individual immigrants, indicate that racism and neo-Nazism have now begun to spread on a large scale in Sweden. However, the hard core of ultranationalists and neo-Nazis consist of only about 200 people (Löw 1998). They may conceivably have about 2,000 sympathisers. Instead of rallying broad public support, a more likely interpretation is that the neo-Nazi groups have recently been agitating more

violently than before. Thus members of White Aryan Resistance have been tried and convicted of stealing weapons and robbing banks. Suspects arrested for the attacks on refugee reception centres have turned out to be young men who could not be linked to known racist organizations.

The most important finding from the 1993 national survey was that public opinion had become considerably more critical of continued immigration of refugees, family and kin, and manpower than in 1987. But the measures that were employed did not confirm that xenophobic and racist attitudes were actually gaining ground in Sweden. On the whole, only very few respondents could be categorized as expressing blatantly racist views. For various reasons a six-year follow-up in 1999 was not carried out. No recent national study of public attitudes to immigration and immigrants is available.

The restrictive views on immigration that surfaced in the 1993 survey are unlikely to have changed since then. Government policy is to restrict immigration, and the public opinion is to some extent a reflection of this policy. Despite the increase in racist activation and the fact that neo-Nazi parties won a few seats in local government in some towns, the result of the election in 1998 was that the extreme right parties only received 1.5 percent of the votes. In some towns they managed to get three to four percent, sufficient to give them one or two seats in local government. These results should be compared to the electoral success of the extreme right in several European countries. (More about the activation of the extreme right in section 4.4).

4.2 Surveys of experienced discrimination in the labour market

During the days of labour migration when there were jobs going for everyone reports about discrimination in the labour market were rare. Unemployment was virtually unheard of and salaries were good. However, things started to change with the downturn of the economy in the mid 1970s. A lot of public money was put into various sectors—ship-building was one—to avoid rises in unemployment. For a few years this policy worked, that is to say, the ends of evading mass unemployment was achieved, but at the cost of a long-term deterioration of the economy. When the issue of racial and ethnic discrimination came to the fore in the late 1970s it was typically not in conjunction with the labour market but as a response to the fact that some restaurants barred African migrants from entry. In 1982 the economic problems of the country were tackled by a decisive and unexpected devaluation of the currency which led to an apparent swift recovery—critics say by artificial means. When a new downturn of the economy hit Sweden in the early 1990s the devaluation trick could not be used again. This time unemployment rates rose dramatically as industry cut down on manpower. Migrants were especially hard hit. The problem of discrimination in the labour market was brought to the fore.

It is hard to verify discrimination when it takes place because discriminators are well aware that it is not accepted behaviour. The outcomes of discrimination are possible to document and analyze in the skewed distributions of employment, income, position, economic and cultural capital. Considerable differences in unemployment rates for Swedes and persons of foreign origin may be an indicator of discrimination. There may be other explanations that need to be analyzed in each individual case. If similar trends reoccur in different domains and for

different ethnic groups, while alternative explanations may be ruled out, finally no other explanation than discrimination remains.

Another possibility is to ask people about their personal experiences. Here we need to distinguish between objective and subjective discrimination. Objective discrimination is a negative degrading and exclusionary treatment that is established by a third independent party according to certain legal or otherwise accepted external criteria. Subjective discrimination represents the victim's personal experience of being hit by this kind of treatment. In everyday life people (victims, perpetrators as well as possible witnesses) usually recognize a discriminatory act. It is nevertheless exceptionally difficult to prove that the treatment one person may experience as discrimination corresponds to a discriminatory intention held by the accused perpetrator. In some cases there was a discriminatory intention, in other cases it may be denied. Witnesses are rarely around. When it comes to one person's testimony word against another's and no other evidence is available, courts must free the accused of charges. Few cases of discrimination have therefore been brought to court in Sweden. It does not follow, however, that subjective discrimination should be disregarded as a source of information. Obviously there are problems of reliability and validity. Some respondents may feel that they are discriminated against when there is no objective indication that this is the case. Others may be the victims of objective discrimination but don't experience it as such. The normal situation is, however, that subjective experiences of discrimination normally are good indicators of objective discrimination. For this reason the office of the Ombudsman against ethnic and racial discrimination (DO), set up in 1986 (more about this in section 6.3), initiated a series of surveys of experienced discrimination. Four surveys have been carried out this far and analyzed by Anders Lange in 1995, 1996, 1998 and 1999. The results of all four surveys may be pieced together into a comprehensive picture of discrimination in Swedish society. I will draw upon Lange's summary.

Migrant groups who were thought to be particularly vulnerable to discrimination were selected for the study. These included migrants from a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa, migrants from a range of Arabic speaking countries as well as Turks, Iranians, Indians, Vietnamese and Chinese. Other groups were included for reference. These included migrants from various Latin American countries and finally Greeks, Poles, Finns and Danes. The questionnaire differentiates between the three domains: discrimination for which the authorities are responsible, discrimination in public places, and discrimination in the work-place.

Lange's surveys prove that discrimination has turned into a serious problem. Its occurrence is not explained by social factors such as age, education, social class, sex, but by national or ethnic origin. All ethnic and national categories selected for the surveys report that it is hard to make Swedish friends. This observation indicates that subtle forms of discrimination may well be at work in social life. All categories—Muslims in particular—report that they experience problems of practising religion in Sweden. A majority of the respondents have little trust in politicians, the employment agencies, the social welfare agencies and the National Board of Immigration. They have more faith in the good intentions of the schools and the health services. The less faith one has in the authorities, the less does one feel affinity with Sweden. Up to 75 percent of the respondents feel that racism and xenophobia has increased in Sweden over the past few years. Those who report personal experiences of discrimination feel more strongly than

others that racism has increased. In one of his studies Lange found that 67 percent of all men of African origin had experienced discrimination in conjunction with seeking work, 48 percent harassed at the work place, 65 percent refused entry to a restaurant and 60 percent overtly threatened and abused in public spaces. Iranians and Chileans also reported exceptionally high incidents of discrimination.

People's experience of being subjected to discrimination need not necessarily coincide with a discriminatory intention in the other. The victim may make out intentions that are not there, or s/he may misinterpret the situation as discriminatory when this is not at all the case. Be that as it may. The recurrent patterns of subjective discrimination in several social domains reported by a range of ethnic groups in Sweden can hardly be explained as anything else but traces of actual discrimination.

Discrimination in the labour market is a most serious threat to integration, and something that the Swedish authorities have had great problems in coming to terms with. First the government refused (contrary to UN recommendations and the recommendations from several independent commissions) to legislate against discrimination on the grounds that this would go against the well established policy of non-interference in the labour market. The government argued that discrimination was something that the parties of the labour market would deal with most effectively. Secondly, when legislation came it was too weak to have any real effect.

Currently Sweden is experiencing an upturn of the economy and unemployment rates are going down. They are, however, still exceptionally high for persons of foreign origin. Swedes are employed in the first place. A recently published study shows, contrary to the general assumption, that persons of foreign origin are *not* less well qualified than Swedes. This report presents yet another piece of evidence that of discrimination in the work place is a most serious problem that needs to be dealt with. The alternative is to accept the fact that a new underclass defined by ethnicity and race is in the process of forming.

4.3 The rise of ethnically segregated housing areas

In a television interview for the news and broadcasted by one of the national channels, a young man in his late teens, born in Sweden to immigrant parents, and living in Alby, one of Stockholm's segregated suburbs, said that when he took the underground into the city centre he felt he was entering foreign territory. Therefore he seldom left the neighbourhood although the centre of Stockholm with its culturally diversified night life attracting many young people is less than half an hour distant from Alby by the underground. Blurred cultural boundaries are right there at the centre of power.

Current debate in Sweden on multiculturalism is about open racism, unemployment, segregation in the housing market, and how to bring people from the immigrant sector in to full participation in the societal processes. Multiculturalism is geographically located to specific housing areas in the major cities. In some of these 75 percent of the residents are of non-European origin. To counteract these concentrations the authorities developed a dispersal policy, sending accepted refugees to smaller towns all over the country, in view of increasing

the chances of integration into mainstream society (see also sections 1.4 and 3.4). What this policy actually has led to is instead that segregation has been introduced on a national scale. In this section I will take the example of Stockholm. Greater Stockholm is the largest and most populous urban area in Sweden, and the one with the largest concentration of migrants.

Stockholm's development has always been closely linked to immigration to Sweden. Labour immigrants settled in the major industrial towns and cities of which Stockholm was the most important. Particularly the Finnish presence in Stockholm is very significant as it always has been. The city is the principal port for the shipping lines connecting Sweden and Finland. A serious housing shortage arose in the 1950s and 1960s which hit young people and immigrants severely. The population of Stockholm grew rapidly in the post-war years through immigration and urbanisation. Today greater Stockholm has a population of 1.7 million. Most of the expansion since the 1960s has taken place in the surrounding municipalities. Within its administrative boundaries the city itself has 750,000 inhabitants.

To come to terms with the housing shortage in Sweden's major cities, the government set up an ambitious construction programme in the late 1960s. One million apartments were to be built in Sweden. A series of new suburbs arose on the outskirts of Stockholm and other cities, but nowhere as extensively as in Stockholm. Swedish housing is generally considered to be of a high standard by international standards. However, the 'million apartments programme' does not quite meet with these general standards. The individual flats are satisfactory as far as size, heating and equipment are concerned. It is rather the local environment itself, the lack of work-places and cultural activities, in some cases unsatisfactory public transport, and segregation that has made many of these residential areas unattractive to middle class Swedes.

For many years greater Stockholm has had a large intake of immigrants and refugees. Partly as a response to this situation, and partly for administrative reasons, the government set up an ambitious programme of refugee reception in 1985 (mentioned earlier). One main objective was to make use of available housing in smaller towns and to relieve the major cities of their burden for resettling refugees. Today we know that this dispersal policy was not entirely successful. In many cases resettled refugees tried to move to Stockholm once they had completed the programme, because of its more dynamic labour market and better opportunities for education. Although migration to Stockholm could have been larger than it is had not the dispersal policies been implemented, Stockholm is still the major receiver of refugee migrants.

Like many other cities, the greater Stockholm metropolitan area has grown in concentric circles. The centre of the modern city is located on the north shore of the outlet from Lake Mälaren to the Baltic. The central city of our own times still reflects its historical experiences of social class segregation from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Today social class segregation in the inner city is no longer as apparent since apartments there are in great demand and therefore expensive irrespective of district. However, the pattern of social class segregation reproduced itself as suburbs developed beyond the inner city limits. Furthermore, social class segregation from the turn of the last century has carried on into ethnic segregation today. Or to put it more bluntly, ethnic segregation as it appears today is primarily determined by social class. However, there is one notable exception to the general spatial organization of social class in the greater Stockholm metropolitan area. This implies that another factor has to

be taken into account to explain the current situation. This factor is about scarcity of available land for housing development within the existing administrative boundaries. The socio-structural conditions that give rise to segregation are educational differences, differential distribution of power, weak political participation, large income differences and insecure jobs. Unemployment aggravates the situation. On the attitudinal level negative stereotypes, prejudice and differential evaluations reinforce practices of ethnic and racial discrimination.

Garden suburbs that subsequently developed beyond the city limits in the early twentieth century definitely reproduced the general pattern of social class distribution. The working classes were basically located to the southern suburbs, the upper classes to the north-eastern sector, and the middle classes to the north-western sector. Of course there are exceptions to this general pattern—pockets of working class areas in the north-west and north-east. This general pattern, however, is well established and quite visible in the size of houses and gardens in the ring of garden suburbs, and not in the least in local political culture. Local government in the north-eastern municipalities has always been dominated by the conservative party, whereas most of the southern municipalities have been led by Social Democrats.

Basically this same pattern has reiterated itself as the metropolitan area expanded beyond the ring of garden suburbs, and beyond the administrative boundaries of Stockholm city itself. The residential areas developed in the 1950s and 1960s beyond the ring of garden suburbs represent a denser type of communities, populationwise and housingwise, consisting primarily of blocks of apartment houses with shopping centres at the local subway station. The southernmost parts of Stockholm itself and the municipalities *south* of Stockholm have significantly higher degrees of working class population than elsewhere and also a significantly higher number of inhabitants who are foreign born. The most significant exception to this pattern is an area within the administrative borders of Stockholm to the north-west. The municipalities north east are still by and large residential areas for the upper classes, and the north-western municipalities are predominantly middle class areas.

In the late 1960s most of the available land within the administrative boundaries of Stockholm city had been used. However, state owned land in the north west that had been reserved as military training grounds was made available for building through concessions made by the state. Also some land in the south west was leased from the municipality of Huddinge. Stockholm's share of 'million apartments' housing programme was thus concentrated to *Kista*, *Rinkeby* and *Tensta* in the north west and to *Skärholmen* in the south.

Initially Swedish working class families settled in the 'million apartments' housing areas. Fairly soon, however, a process of ethnic segregation started to establish itself. Immigrants moved in, Swedes moved out. In 1984 Andersson-Brolin presented a study of ethnic segregation. Since then the rate of segregation has gone up quite considerably. In some suburbs there are virtually no children with Swedish born parents. The principal areas of immigrant settlement in greater Stockholm are *Kista*, *Rinkeby* and *Tensta* as well as *Skärholmen* and *Vantör* in Stockholm itself, the northern part of Botkyrka, western Södertälje, and some parts of Huddinge. In practically all of these housing areas, but most strikingly in *Rinkeby*, *Tensta*, north Botkyrka native Swedes have moved out. When these areas were built quite a large percentage of the immigrants then located there were Finns. Now the Finnish presence is

gradually diminishing as later arrivals are moving in, among others Somalis. These apartments are rented, not owned by the tenant.

By international comparison the most striking element of segregation in the Stockholm case seems to be not so much a situation of ethnically distinct housing areas, although there is a slight tendency to this kind of situation for the Turkish born, but rather that foreign born persons are lumped together in residential areas with very few Swedish born inhabitants.

In some ethnically segregated housing areas (parts of *Kista* is an interesting case) education among some dominant groups of foreign born (Iranians) is high, yet unemployment is also high. In the district of *Hammarby*, with a relatively low percentage of foreign born, education is low and unemployment high.

In 1997 the city council of Stockholm published a policy document presenting an ambitious programme to improve the living conditions for the city's inhabitants. The programme may be summarised in four points:

- Create new jobs
- Put an end to segregation
- Create conditions for a sustainable ecological development
- Develop general welfare

Segregation in the housing sector is a serious problem for a welfare state since so much of the social services and welfare programmes are organized according to spatial principles with the residential area as the hub. This applies to schools and education in general, recreational opportunities, social welfare, labour market exchanges, and health care. Segregation is an outcome of social inequality. Because houses and neighbourhoods are planned to exist for longer periods of time than a human lifetime, housing represents a factor of inertia when it comes to social change. Once segregated residential areas have come into existence, they tend to reinforce social inequality. Segregation in housing is visually pregnant in a way that skewed distributions of income, life prospects, well-being, health etc. are not. Segregation results from processes in which the market mechanisms in a complex manner reinforce and magnify discriminatory processes that initially may have been more subtle and restricted.

4.4 Protest parties and the increase of neo-Nazi racist activism

The 1990s has witnessed the rise of xenophobic violence all over western Europe. In the UK mainly people of Afro-Caribbean and Asian origin have been the targets, in France migrants from the Mahgreb. In Germany, the Netherlands and Scandinavia right-wing violence has been directed at asylum-seekers and accepted refugees, primarily from non-European countries. Ever since World War II some insignificant right wing extremist organizations have expressed their anti-Semitic, anti-immigrant, anti-refugee and racist views. In the 1970s and most of the 1980s these groups were numerically small. They lacked financial means, and they were politically marginalized. A dramatic change has taken place over the past decade inasmuch as these organizations now have started to attract a considerably larger following than before.

Perhaps even more importantly, they have run into big money, thus providing them with the means to refine and professionalize their political propaganda. There are no simple answers as to what has caused this development. Explanations must be sought in the interaction of a variety of factors and conditions. A crucial question is whether these right wing actions have affected or will affect public opinion in the future. The evidence is contradictory.

During the past decade parties have formed, or been revived, that exploit public discontent with unemployment, tax burdens and above all immigration. Throughout Europe popular support for the radical right parties has grown dramatically. The numbers are striking. In Antwerp the *Vlaams Blok* received 28 percent of the vote, the *National Front* in France received 15 percent in the latest presidential election, and the Austrian *Freedom Party* under Jörg Haider won the recent elections, and in Italy the *Lega Nord* has achieved a wide following.

On the other hand, opinion polls that have been carried out in Germany and Sweden, and earlier in Denmark and Finland, indicate that there is no rise in the level of overt racism and xenophobia in the general public. How does this tally with the electoral results?

Methodological biases do not explain the Swedish results, that is to say, the items and scales that were devised to measure racist attitudes do not indicate any significant increase in racist or xenophobic attitudes.

Again, this observation conflicts with the evidence that the number of racist offences have increased in recent years (Tegsten 1997, Karttunen 1998, Karttunen 1999). In Sweden 660 offences of a racist, xenophobic or Nazi nature were reported to the police in 1994. For 1995 this figure had more than doubled to 1,481. For 1998 the number had almost doubled again to 2,622. A considerable number of these offences are regarded as severe: murder, attempted murder, armed robbery, assault and battery, desecration of Jewish grave yards, fire bombings and arson, and attacks on the criminal justice system by threats to silence witnesses, policemen, prosecutors and judges. Three xenophobically related murders were reported in 1995. Since then the political violence from the extreme right has escalated. In 1999 the record includes the attempted assassination of two journalists investigating political organizations to the extreme right, the attempted murder of a policeman and then the murder of two other policemen by Nazi activists after a bank robbery, and the assassination of a trade union representative who protested the election of a Nazi as the spokesman of the local union. The minister of justice, Laila Freivalds, rightly characterized the fusion of right-wing extremists with serious crime as nothing else but sheer terrorism.

Obviously there are methodological problems of categorisation involved in comparisons of this kind over time because of changing criteria and perception of what is regarded (by the police) as xenophobic or race-related offences. Partly the rise in race-related offences in Sweden may be an effect of increased police awareness. However, the number of people who subscribe to racist and xenophobic publications has increased, and the sales of so called 'white power' or 'white noise' music has skyrocketed. Sweden is one of the major producers, distributors and exporters of this kind of music, the sales of which have brought big money to the xenophobic movements. Having to contend with the overt racist propaganda disseminated

by the new xenophobic movements, it is no wonder that ethnic minorities, immigrants, refugees, and especially persons of non-European origin, experience fear what the future has in store for them. This fear should also be regarded as an indicator of a rise in the general level of xenophobia.

Xenophobia is dread and dislike of the stranger, the outsider, and reluctance to admit him into one's group. A central element of xenophobic ideology is the social construction of Otherness. The experience of Otherness—of difference, of not belonging, of the unknown—is a basic human experience, fundamental to the experience of sociality, which can only integrate by differentiating (Wong 1991), a conceptualisation that harks back to Simmel's (1971) provocative analysis of the stranger in our midst.

Xenophobic violence cannot be explained by personality problems. Perpetrators of xenophobic violence are usually young males, a large majority of whom are not yet 20 years of age. Their school records are weak, many are drop-outs, some long term unemployed. Quite a few have previous criminal records and are from working class backgrounds. Many are attracted to the skin-head movement. They represent social groups experiencing competition from immigrants and refugees in the labour market, in the housing market and in the 'marriage market'. Skin-head culture, that originally developed among the English working classes, has been exported to a number of other European countries. The skin-head style itself is an identity of Otherness. However, young men from middle-class backgrounds are also drawn to the Nazi movement. They represent a new, more politically and ideologically conscious, type of members.

Most people abhor the violence employed by the Nazi activists, but their cause touches upon feelings of being exposed, abandoned and sold out that large sections of the lower classes have experienced. All too many lack confidence in the political system. Politicians are held in contempt. Ring-wing parties, violent skin-head groups and frustrated youths have thus found a common point of interest in resistance to refugees.

In some countries protest parties that are not openly xenophobic have obtained a much larger share of the vote than the reawakened neo-Nazi and fascist parties. However, appearances may be deceptive. These protest parties are paving the way for the more extreme parties to the right. Their electoral successes have enabled the xenophobic movements to expand their organizations and to propagate their views more efficiently. The political infrastructure of the radical right is thus reinforced which in turn is likely to lead to broader electoral successes in the future. Moreover, the success of these parties legitimizes public expressions of intolerance.

Extremist groups to the political right drift into violence and thus gain new strength and 'recognition'. Some analysts claim that the right wing organizations have gained new strength through weak state responses. Protest parties and right-wing parties that exploit a frustrated opinion by pointing to immigration as one of the essential causes of unemployment, economic cuts, crime and social conflict, are forcing other parties to adopt more restrictive views on immigration of refugees.

Europe is now facing the consequences of the inescapable move towards a post industrial society with its high levels of structural unemployment. Neither heavy industry nor the public sector are capable of creating unqualified jobs to an extent that would substantially change levels of unemployment. The inability of the political system to deal with these structural problems may well be related to the fact that party structures and the ideologies that they subscribe to are basically derived from the early twentieth century experiences. Generational gaps add to the problem. Young people are finding it increasingly difficult to get a foothold in the labour market and are facing competition with immigrants over the scarce resources of jobs. Persons in their midlife who have secure jobs are defending their interests. Social exclusion is hitting new groups about to enter the labour market—the young and the immigrants. One might put it that forty years ago there was an abundance of jobs in western Europe but limited chances of getting a good education. Today there is an abundance of educational opportunities but a scarcity of jobs.

In conclusion, then, reactions to the refugee crisis have taken place at different interacting levels. Immigration policies have become increasingly restrictive ever since the early 1970s and have now been extended and applied to political migrants and family reunions as well. Refugees, then, come up against an increasingly critical public opinion, a proliferation of racist actions and a growing popular support for right-wing parties. There has been a marked increase in the political activity of the extreme right and an upsurge of violence directed at immigrants, refugees and minorities in a number of European cities. Networks of neo-Nazi and fascist organizations are establishing themselves across national boundaries. Nationalistic ideology is spreading throughout Europe, generating a vicious circle of social exclusion, intolerance and distrust in democratic solutions. Immigrants and ethnic minorities, however, hardly accept the role of passive victims of racial violence, but tend to mobilise counter-forces. The activation of the extreme right has led to counter reactions. A vast majority of young people are not persuaded by the Nazi propaganda but rather take a clear stand against racism and neo-Nazi ideas. One way of describing these developments, then, is in terms of increasing *polarisation*.

5. Models of integration

5.1 *The Scandinavian model: Indicators of integration*

In this chapter the model developed by Jeroen Doomernik (1998) will be applied to the Swedish situation. Integration has become a key word in recent years in Sweden to cope with the inequalities between native born Swedes and the part of the population of foreign origin, inequalities that became dramatically apparent during the latest and most severe downturn of the economy since the 1930s, and reinforced by vicious outbursts of neo-Nazi violence. The *National Board of Immigration* was reorganized with responsibility now for questions pertaining to immigration control, residence permits, work permits and citizenship and naturalization applications. The *National Board of Integration*, an offshoot from the Board of Immigration, was to be responsible for incorporating newcomers into society, developing ideas about integration, public opinion moulding, combating racism and xenophobia and implementing the new policies of diversity at the work-place. Although there is a new recognition that integration implies mutual adjustment, and that the burden of integrating is not merely the task of people of foreign origin, there is nevertheless an implicit understanding that the rhetorics of integration really amount to a less brutally presented assimilation policy. In the following chapter I will problematize the concept of integration. The point of departure here is the report by Doomernik on analyzing the effectiveness of integration policies.

Integration should be understood both as a process and as a state, Doomernik correctly points out, quoting Böhning. The integration process differs for different types of nations. Following Castles and Miller (1993) four ideal types of nationhood are outlined: The imperial model, the ethnic model, the republican model and the multicultural model. The Swedish state and nation does not correspond to the imperial or republican models. From the preceding chapters it will be clear that the Swedish immigration and "immigrant" policies aspire to operate from the premise that modern Swedish society may be classified as an example of the multicultural model. On the other hand, it is also obviously clear that that this understanding is not generally accepted in society. One doesn't have to allude to the extreme right to recognize an undercurrent of ethnic distinctiveness.

What makes the Swedish situation slightly confusing and different to multicultural policies in Australia and Canada, and perhaps even the Netherlands, is that the Swedish brand of multiculturalism appears to be aimed—ultimately—at assimilation. Several observations support this interpretation.

1. There is still virtually no recognition of the cultural demands of indigenous ethnic minorities—the Saami and the Tornedal Finns.
2. Freedom of choice applies to individuals, not to ethnic or cultural collectives.
3. Minority organizations are monitored at the same as they are supported.
4. Power is highly centralized.

In a number of respects Sweden qualifies as a nation according to the ethnic model. But it doesn't go to the extremes of the ethnic model as it applies in Germany. With regard to the nation forming processes the difference between the two countries is that the Swedish state existed but needed to be filled with national content. In Germany a nation existed but needed to

form a state. Thus the two nation states formed under different conditions. In the Swedish case regional and linguistic, cultural and ethnic differences had to be rubbed out (inclusion through homogenization and assimilation of the other) whereas in the German case cultural and ethnic commonalities needed to be stressed (cohesion through exclusion of the other). The Swedish nation state inherited a centralized power apparatus dating back to the sixteenth century, the Reformation and the unification of the Swedish state under Gustav Vasa.

Neither does Sweden qualify as a state of the multicultural type, despite the policy emphasis on an acceptance of cultural pluralism and lip-service paid to multiculturalism. Sweden has experienced a relatively large immigration, not as large in proportion to its population as the stock of foreign citizens in Switzerland, Germany, France, Belgium or Austria, and approximately the same is the Netherlands and the UK. Although the "immigrant" policy from 1975 represented a radical change, it cannot compare to the multicultural ideals that have won acceptance in Australia and Canada. Sweden is still firmly rooted as a nation state with a history of immigration. It is not an immigration state that is developing a sense of nationhood through multiculturalism.

The nineteenth century nation-building processes became entangled with the simultaneous industrialization and political awakening of the working classes. The Social Democratic Party, in government for 58 of the 67 years since 1932, didn't initiate the nation formation process, but nation building became intertwined with the reform policies the party set out to carry through. This is captured by the concept of *folkhem*—a home for the people—expressing values of equality, solidarity and national unity. The Social Democratic project was to eradicate class differences but in the process of doing so also to reduce regional, ethnic and cultural differences. The traditional goal of integration (read assimilation) is aptly expressed in the *folkhem* metaphor. When the issue of integrating immigrants and people of foreign origin into the welfare state, the well established *folkhem* model of social integration was already available. The essence of the Swedish model is one of reducing class differences, and when translated to the new situation, to reduce cultural and ethnic differences by disregarding them, by ignoring those (on either side) who stress cultural and ethnic differences. The positive formulation of this policy is emphasizing equality.

It appears, then, that Sweden doesn't quite conform to any of ideal types proposed by Castles and Miller. A fifth model might be termed the Scandinavian model. The welfare state models of Denmark and Norway are relatively similar. (Finland is a different matter because the very small share of migrants.) The Scandinavian model may be understood as a "compromise" between the two opposite ideal types—the ethnic and multicultural models. This is a kind of counterpart to the Scandinavian/Swedish welfare state model combining elements of planned economy within a market economy. Sweden has chosen a similar strategy with regard to its relationship to the EU: Becoming a member but not engaging whole heartedly in the project. In terms of evaluating the effectiveness of integration the same indicators as those proposed by Doornik apply: The labour market, education, the housing market, and legal status.

5.2 Trends in the labour market—work force and employment

The employment data utilized in this report are based on regular surveys of the employment situation (AKU) carried out by Statistics Sweden. The surveys are carried out once per month, and based on large random samples consisting of several parallel panels. Despite the fact that these surveys are not total counts, the AKU data give a more accurate and objective picture of the employment situation than the data presented by the *National Board of Labour* which are based upon weekly counts of the total number of job seekers. Differences in the definition of *Table 8*. Total working population 1998 by gender and age, *in thousands*, and for comparison unemployment and participation indices for 1995. Sources: AKU 1995 and 1996.

Age	Gender	Employed (1)	Unemployed (2)	Non work force (3)	Total population (4)	Unemployment index (2) by (1)+(2)		Participation index (1) by (4)	
		1998	1998	1998	1998	1995	1998	1995	1998
16-24	M	205	30	248	483	16.7	12.9	41.8	42.4
	F	188	23	251	462	13.9	10.7	43.0	40.7
	M+F	393	53	499	945	15.3	11.9	42.4	41.6
25-54	M	1,571	101	211	1,883	7.2	6.0	84.1	83.4
	F	1,433	86	294	1,813	5.9	5.6	81.1	79.1
	M+F	3,004	187	505	3,696	6.6	5.8	82.6	81.3
55-64	M	303	23	135	461	8.4	7.0	64.4	65.8
	F	279	14	170	463	6.2	4.7	59.3	60.3
	M+F	582	37	305	924	7.4	5.9	61.9	63.0

employment, unemployment and job-seeking account for the deviating results. People temporarily attending vocational programmes and labour market courses organized by the *National Board of Labour* are not counted as unemployed in these counts. This information, then, does not take the individual's intentions of seeking work into consideration. The aim is rather to assess the effectiveness of the measures taken by the labour market agencies to *reduce* the number of unemployed. High rates of unemployment are politically embarrassing to a government that has pledged to create new jobs and bring down unemployment. This is fair enough but it does not provide a reliable ground for comparative analyses over time or between countries. I will draw on the AKU data for 1998 and compare the situation for 1995.

In March 1996 prime minister Ingvar Carlsson resigned having reached the age of retirement. Carlsson stepped in as the leader of the Social Democratic Party in March 1986 after the assassination of Olof Palme. He also had to replace Palme as prime minister of Sweden. Carlsson was in office 1986 to 1991. He lost the 1991 election to a non-Socialist coalition led by Carl Bildt who was prime minister 1991 to 1994. However, Carlsson won the 1994

election and was once again prime minister. In March 1996 he was succeeded in both capacities by Göran Persson, Carlsson's former minister of finance. In his policy declaration Persson stated that one of the main tasks he was setting for his government was to halve the level of unemployment by the turn of the century and restore the economy to a sounder basis. Given the fact that the data for 1999 are not yet assembled Mr. Persson still has the chance to fulfil his promise.

The data given in table 8 show that the overall rate of unemployment has decreased since 1995. The principal explanation is a global upturn in the economy which ultimately also affects the Swedish labour market. Secondly, the government has managed to reorganize and restore the public finances to a sounder basis through drastic cuts in public expenses. This has

Table 9. Working population of non-Swedish citizens 1998, by citizenship and gender, in thousands. The unemployment and participation indices for 1995 are given for comparison. Sources: AKU 1995 and 1998.

Citizen of	Gender	Em- ployed (1)	Unem- ployed (2)	Non work force (3)	Total popula- tion (4)	Unemployment index (2) by (1)+(2)		Participation index (1) by (4)	
		1998	1998	1998	1998	1995	1998	1995	1998
All non- Swedes	M	94	28	61	183	24.3	22.6	48.6	51.4
	F	81	17	89	187	21.1	17.1	40.7	43.3
	M+F	175	45	150	370	22.8	20.2	44.6	47.3
Chile	M	3	0	1	4	29.1	8.1	50.3	63.0
	F	2	1	1	5	34.3	20.5	31.7	55.0
	M+F	5	1	3	9	31.2	14.6	40.9	58.8
Den- mark	M	8	1	3	11	14.5	10.2	62.3	67.4
	F	4	0	2	7	12.4	9.2	60.0	62.5
	M+F	12	1	5	18	14.0	9.9	67.2	65.5
Finland	M	21	2	9	32	12.6	10.2	58.8	67.4
	F	27	2	13	42	12.3	7.3	62.8	64.6
	M+F	48	4	22	74	12.5	8.3	61.1	65.0
Iran	M	3	2	4	10	37.4	41.7	39.1	33.0
	F	2	1	3	6	37.4	22.3	24.7	39.5
	M+F	6	3	7	16	37.4	34.9	32.7	35.5

Norway	M	7	1	3	11	16.2	12.4	69.2	62.4
	F	9	1	4	14	11.5	10.1	65.2	62.7
	<i>M+F</i>	15	2	7	24	14.0	11.1	67.2	62.6
Poland	M	2	0	1	4	19.8	9.7	53.7	61.6
	F	3	1	5	9	33.8	25.0	37.5	35.7
	<i>M+F</i>	5	1	6	12	29.2	19.4	42.3	43.0
Turkey	M	3	1	2	6	22.2	23.6	46.8	50.7
	F	1	0	6	7	34.4	24.8	21.9	11.6
	<i>M+F</i>	4	1	8	13	26.7	23.9	34.0	30.4
Yugo- slavia	M	11	8	16	35	42.4	43.6	23.8	31.0
	F	7	5	23	35	35.0	40.4	14.9	21.0
	<i>M+F</i>	18	13	39	70	39.8	42.4	19.4	26.0

affected working conditions in public health care and schools negatively and the final analysis of the restoration policy is yet to come. Thirdly, the reduction of the unemployment rates is explained to some extent by demographic changes. The number of persons aged 16-24 is lower for 1998 than it was for 1995. Competition for available jobs is less stiff because there are more jobs going as well as fewer competitors. On the other hand, the number of persons aged 55-64 has increased. These demographic trends interact with the upturn of the economy. Fewer people on their way out of the labour market have had to be laid off before retirement because of the better times. Participation in the work-force has increased for the 55-64 age bracket but decreased slightly for the 16-24 and 25-54 age brackets.

Table 9 presents data on the employment situation of non-Swedish citizens for 1998. The columns giving the unemployment and participation indices have been supplemented with the corresponding figures for 1995. A first general observation is that the unemployment rates for non-Swedish citizens are much higher than for Swedish citizens. We are speaking of a factor corresponding to almost twice as high rates for Nordic citizens, and five times higher for non-Nordic citizens for the age bracket 25-54. Although the aggregated data indicate slight gender differences for the non-Swedish citizens, we find at closer scrutiny quite substantial dissimilarities in this respect for some groups. Gender differences are particularly striking for Chileans, Poles and Iranians. The unemployment rates are much higher for Chilean and Polish women than they are for men. The situation was the same in 1995 except for the fact that the unemployment rates were generally much higher. For Iranians the reverse situation applies. Unemployment rates have risen for Iranian men but gone down considerably for Iranian women.

The profile of the Nordic citizens rather resembles that of Swedish citizens. Unemployment has gone down considerably at the same time as labour market participation has not changed much (increased for Finns but decreased for Danes and Norwegians), whereas for others the overall unemployment rates and participation have only improved marginally. For Yugoslavs an already bad situation in 1995 has even deteriorated despite the general economic upturn.

For the Nordic citizens the unemployment index is consistently higher and their participation index is consistently lower than for Swedish citizens, but in comparison to the situation for other-European and non-European citizens it is much better. Yugoslavs have a high unemployment rate and a very low participation rate. To some extent this may be due to the large influx of refugees in recent years who have not yet been able establish themselves in the labour market. For the Iranians, a group that has been in Sweden for quite some time and thus should have had the time to establish themselves, the situation is most serious, characterized as it is by an exceptionally high level of unemployment and low participation rate.

To some extent, then, these data reflect forces of discrimination operating in a subtle manner in the labour market. On the whole Nordic citizens appear to be accepted whereas east European and non-European citizens are encountering considerable difficulties of finding jobs. The high unemployment rates for non-Nordic citizens entail substantial costs for the public sector because the unemployed are dependent upon social welfare. In turn this situation tends to reinforce negative stereotypes and prejudiced views of immigrants as being unwilling to work and to have come to Sweden to benefit from the social welfare system. One of the main obstacles to improving societal integration is, then, by reducing the high levels of unemployment by which so many permanently residing foreign citizens have been hit.

Table 10. Employed foreign citizens 1995 and 1998 by branch of industry and type of employment, *in percent*. Source: AKU 1995 and 1998.

Branch of industry, business	1995				1998			
	Employed perma- nently	tempo- rarily	Enter- prisers	OVER ALL	Employed perma- nently	tempo- rarily	Enter- prisers	OVER ALL
Agriculture etc.	1	2	3	1	1	2	16	3
Mining, energy	15	7	4	12	12	7	6	11
Manufacturing	16	7	5	12	11	5	4	10
Construction	3	2	7	3	5	5	11	6
Trade	9	8	31	12	12	11	20	13
Transport	6	5	4	5	7	6	7	7
Business, commerce	10	9	17	11	11	9	18	12
Education, research	7	15	1	8	8	12	1	8
Caring	21	28	2	21	20	28	3	19

Cleaning etc.	10	14	25	13	6	13	14	8
Civil service	2	3	0	2	6	4	0	5
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Table 10 gives data on employed foreign citizens by branch of industry and type of employment for 1995 and 1998. On the whole very few foreign citizens are employed in agriculture, the civil service and construction. The main fields of employment are industry, trade and business, caring and the service industry (cleaning). The overall situation has changed very little since 1995.

Agriculture is more or less a closed sector to foreign citizens for reasons relating to land tenure but also to the distribution of foreign citizens in the socio-geographical space. Therefore the increase in enterprising among foreign citizens in this sector is quite unexpected. The work places of the civil service sector are situated primarily in the major cities in which the bulk of the foreign citizens reside. There has been an increase since 1995. It goes without saying that certain jobs within the civil service are, and have to be, closed to foreign citizens, actually all kinds of positions relating to government and national security. It is reasonable to assume that there must also exist an abundance of clerical jobs within this sector which in principle should be open to foreign citizens, jobs that have no bearing upon government or national security issues. One possible explanation for the relatively low rate of participation of foreign citizens in this sector is that public expenditures have been the object of large cuts in order to come to grips with the state finances. In a situation when civil servants are made redundant there is little space for employing foreign citizens. However, one cannot dismiss an alternative and supplementary interpretation that points to the fact that subtle mechanisms of discrimination may be at work. Clerical work within the civil service usually requires a good oral and written mastery of the Swedish language, a requirement which then may be used as a justification to disregard applicants who are not Swedish speakers by birth.

Table 11. Employed foreign citizens 1995 and 1998 and Swedes for 1998 by branch of industry, in percent. Sources: AKU 1995 and 1998.

Branch of industry, business	1995			1998			Swedes
	Finns	Other Nordics	Other na- tionalities	Finns	Other Nordics	Other na- tionalities	
Agriculture etc.	0	1	1	1	1	1	1
Mining, energy	17	14	14	13	13	10	11
Manufacturing	18	12	15	18	13	14	10
Construction	3	4	2	5	3	1	5

Trade	7	13	10	9	12	11	12
Transport	5	7	5	7	9	6	7
Business, commerce	9	9	12	10	10	12	11
Education, research	6	6	8	7	6	13	9
Caring	26	25	16	21	25	18	21
Cleaning	6	7	15	8	6	13	7
Civil service	2	2	2	3	4	1	6
	100	100	100	100	100	100	100

Comparatively few foreign citizens are employed in the construction sector. One explanation for this observation relates partly to the specific traditions within the construction sector which has been almost entirely dominated by skilled high-salary, Swedish-born manpower. The only foreign citizens to make it in to this domain have been other Nordics. The large number of labour migrants who came to Sweden during the 1960s were rarely directed towards the construction sector, despite the boom in building during the 1960s. The central commercial districts of practically all Swedish cities were rebuilt, the major transport arteries were redrawn and brought up to a modern standard, and the housing shortage was relieved by a programme aimed at building more than one million new apartments. A dual labour market scenario in the traditional sense never really developed in Sweden due to the fact that foreign labour was given the same rights as Swedish-born manpower. However, in a sense the construction sector served as a reserve for high-salary, Swedish-born labour. In recent years the construction sector is facing large problems because so few major building projects have been undertaken due to a lack of public financing. The unemployment rate is higher for this sector than for most others. In this situation it is virtually impossible for foreign labour to find employment in the sector.

Table 11 presents the same type of data on branches of industry with regard to the three categories Finns, other Nordics and other nationalities, and Swedes for 1998. Very little has changed since 1995. The Finns are not working in the caring sector to the same extent as they used to in 1995. Primarily this is attributable to substantial cuts in the financing of hospitals and other branches of public health care. The differences between Swedes and foreigners is noticeable for the manufacturing sector (overrepresentation of foreign citizens), construction sector (overrepresentation of Swedes), cleaning (overrepresentation of foreign citizens) and the civil service (overrepresentation of Swedes).

Table 12. Employed in relation to position and type of work. Swedes, Foreign citizens, Finns, other Nordics and all other nationalities. In percent. 1998 AKU.

	Swedes	Foreign citizens	Finns	Other Nordics	All other nationalities
Leading positions	4	2	0	4	2
Specialists (theoretical)	15	16	9	18	18

Undergraduate level	20	14	17	17	11
Office and clerical work	12	9	11	11	7
Service, caring, trading	19	18	17	19	19
Agriculture, forestry etc.	1	1	1	1	1
Skilled labour, crafts etc.	11	11	16	9	10
Process, machine, transport	11	15	18	13	14
Unskilled labour	6	13	9	7	17
Military and defence	1	0	0	0	0

Table 12 compares the types of work and positions for Swedes and foreign citizens, the latter are divided into Finns, other Nordics and other nationalities. There are some revealing differences. The Finns still basically represent labour migrants (underrepresented in academic positions and in leading positions, but overrepresented in skilled labour and industry). The pattern for the "other Nordic category"—Danes and Norwegians—resembles the Swedish pattern in most respects. The "other nationalities" category presents a pattern of overrepresentation in theoretical specialization as well as in unskilled labour, but underrepresentation in work at an undergraduate level and clerical work. The differences are not too problematic.

The overall unemployment rates have gone down. The most worrying fact is that unemployment rates for the foreign citizens have not been brought down very much. The goals of integration are therefore in jeopardy. In order to deal with the economic problems of the country, cuts in public expenditures have been made in all sectors. At the same time the government is doing its utmost to reduce the influx of foreign citizens. It has been fairly successful these last few years. A political change of some significance was the appointment of a minister of integration in 1996. In a pragmatic vein integration has been viewed as the task of incorporating and adjusting migrants and foreign citizens into mainstream society. This represents a rather traditional, slanted and ethnocentric view. The main problem is rather of *integrating society*, that is to say, to combat racism, tackle discrimination, reduce tensions that are caused by social inequality, and work towards solutions that involve both mainstream Swedish society and the approximately 4 percent of the population who are foreign citizens. Bringing down the unemployment rates is a necessary but not a sufficient condition to achieve societal integration. In conclusion, then, the integration policies have so far not been particularly effective. The high rates of unemployment among Iranians and Yugoslavs and a number of other groups that are not given in the tables is evidence of this.

Summing up, the problem for foreign citizens is not basically one of position or sector, it is rather one of being employed at all. Recent arrivals from Yugoslavia and non-European groups are particularly hard hit.

5.3 The school system

The school system consists of nine years of compulsory basic education for all children aged 7—16 years. Children from the age of five are entitled to attend preparatory school, but this school is not compulsory. There are plans to lower the age of compulsory school attendance to six years. One way of achieving this reform has been to permit children of six years to start compulsory school if psychological and medical examinations prove them sufficiently mature. All children of 7—16 years irrespective of nationality, and including those whose applications for residence have not been decided, have to attend school. Grades are not given in the comprehensive compulsory school until the last year. Thus students don't compete against one another for grades. Within the compulsory school system children whose home language is not Swedish are entitled to home language training if the practical conditions make it feasible, that there are a sufficient number of pupils to form a class and that a qualified teacher is available.

After the compulsory nine years of school 75—80 percent of the students continue their studies in upper secondary school (not compulsory) for another two or three years. There is wide range of options. More than half of the students favour theoretical programmes that entitle them later to pursue university studies. Those who don't go for the theoretical programmes have a range of vocational or work-related programmes to choose from.

The National Board of Education has recently reported that quite a large proportion of the students who drop out of the upper secondary school are of foreign origin. The causes for young people of immigrant origin to leave school without graduating are complex. They include language problems (especially for recent arrivals), conflicting value systems between family and school, and social marginalization. Discipline is a problem in most schools. There is a certain amount of bullying among the pupils, sometimes verging on racism. Victims and perpetrators may be found among pupils of Swedish as well as of immigrant origin. Obviously children who arrive in Sweden at the age when they must attend school are disadvantaged, but the school system as such does not discriminate between pupils of different nationalities or origins. Immigrant children are entitled to special Swedish language support classes. Private schools run on an ethnic or religious basis are accepted but only a minority of the children of international migrants go to these schools.

Graduated students who wish to improve their grades and migrants who need to qualify for higher education in Sweden may want to attend the adult education programmes that are run by the municipal councils. These programmes are open to all, and have become part of the strategy to combat unemployment. University education is accessible to those who comply with the qualification criteria, but many courses and programmes have restricted intake for economic and practical reasons. One has to compete for the available places on the strength of previous academic merits. There is a risk that insufficient knowledge of Swedish may bar students of immigrant origin from certain courses and programmes.

It is commonly assumed that students of immigrant origin do less well in the educational system than Swedes. However, the evidence to support the hypothesis is wanting. Quite a few studies show on the contrary that students of immigrant origin do quite well in the school system and are on the whole not worse off than Swedes as far as school achievements are concerned. It is clear that many are ambitious, and that parents place a high value on education. This was shown by Olkiewics (1990) in a study of children of international labour migrants in the 1980s.

The data collected by Virta and Westin (1998; 1999) on more recent arrivals support the same conclusion. A good education is regarded as a passport to better jobs and a means to ascertain social mobility for the next generation. The situation may be seen as one of polarization. School work is demanding for those immigrant students who find languages difficult, who don't have the moral support of their parents, or whose family situation may be problematic. Those who drop out of the school system, or do not graduate from the ninth school year, have given up any thought of academic studies. It is important to bear in mind, however, that many others do well in competition with Swedish born students and may well be top of the class. Despite its problems, it seems fair to say that the school system is one of the few arenas in society in which societal integration actually seems to be working.

The school system below the university level is organized in relation to one's place of residence. Segregation can therefore interact negatively with the school system (housing and segregation are treated in section 4.3). There is a definite risk that if segregation in housing becomes a permanent social structure, then schools will also be segregated with negative consequences for Swedish language proficiency among young people from these neighbourhoods.

5.4 Health and social programmes

Foreign citizens residing in Sweden have the same right to health care and social benefits as Swedish citizens. The relationship between migration and health is complex. On the one hand there is a so called *healthy migrant effect*. The meaning of this is that emigrants are not representative of a cross-section of the sending society in terms of health. They are young, healthy and have a sense of initiative. On the other hand, the problems of adapting to the receiving society often take their toll in terms of ailing health. Long-term unemployment which all too many recent migrants have had to live with has a deteriorating effect on people's well-being. Work in physically demanding occupations such as cleaning has caused chronic physical disablement (rheumatism, back-aches, chronic muscular pain etc.). The labour migrants who came to Sweden in the 1950s and 1960s have not fared well in terms of collective physical health. Many have been on long-term sick leave or have had to go on early retirement. Demanding work in industry and service, and long working hours (sometimes up to 16 hours per day in individual cases) took the best out of them. A large share of the political migrants from the 1970s and on, bring with them traumatic experiences as a result of war, persecution, political violence, imprisonment and torture. Their general health problems tend to be of a different kind, pertaining to anxiety, feelings of guilt, aggression and other psychiatric symptoms. Several specialist centres have been established to deal with problems of traumatization and torture.

The health situation of the immigrant population may be expressed in many ways. In table 13 the number of days of sick leave per year is given. The data are from 1990 and thus a bit out of date. However, there is no reason to believe that the trend has changed significantly. The table clearly shows a difference in health status in the different populations. The Nordic countries and Southern Europe including Turkey represent to a large degree the labour migrants with problems of ailing physical health whereas Asia, Africa and Latin America to quite a large extent represent migrants who have been accepted as refugees, and of whom a significant share

Table 13. Number of days on sick leave. 1990

	Men	Women	Both
Western Europe and USA	19.8	27.0	23.4
Native Swedes	21.3	28.7	24.9
Eastern Europe	33.2	44.5	38.9
Nordic countries	37.2	43.6	40.3
Asia	41.7	47.4	44.5
Africa	42.9	47.5	45.1
Latin America	38.5	52.3	45.2
Southern Europe and Turkey	48.2	73.0	60.6

have experiences of political traumatization.

Basically a population's health status and its use of the health services relates to a number of factors, among them:

- lifestyle and consumer patterns
- occupation, employment and type of work
- heredity and environment
- family structure
- sex and age structure
- cultural background and pre-emigration experiences
- education and social class

The migrant population in Sweden is over-represented in the in use of the public health services. There are, however, no indications that their children on the whole are less healthy than there Swedish peers. Child health is monitored during the first year, at four years and then again when school starts. The negative health situation for their parents' generation is an indication that integration into society is not working well. It means that equality in this respect is still to be achieved. It is an indication that a large part of the immigrant population in a number of respects is situated within the lower strata of society. They are harder hit by unemployment and their economic situation is more uncertain than for people in general. In turn this means that they depend more heavily on the social welfare system.

A survey published in 1989 established that one fourth of the beneficiaries of social welfare were foreign born. This is a considerably larger proportion than their corresponding share of the total population. The downturn of the economy that led to exceptionally high unemployment rates in the first part of the 1990s had not really started at the time this survey was carried out. A report published by the association of Swedish municipalities shows that of the refugees who were resettled in 1991 in various municipalities, 74 percent were still dependent upon social welfare as late as 1995. The upturn of the economy the last few years has not led to any substantial decrease of the unemployment rates. Persons of foreign origin are hard hit and thus

become dependent upon social welfare allowances to a much larger extent than ethnic Swedish citizens. It goes without saying that social welfare dependency is an obstacle to integration into society.

5.5 Political participation

Foreign citizens residing permanently in Sweden (denizens) were given the right to vote in elections for local and county government in 1976. Elections for local and county government are held simultaneously with the elections to parliament. Elections used to be held every third year but since 1994 every fourth year. The participation of denizens in the elections for local and county government has gone down over the years (see table 14). The table speaks for itself. People's interest in voting has fallen for all national groups, for some more than for others. This is an unfortunate development. There are a number of explanations as to why this has become the case. Local politics are not given much exposure in the media because of the simultaneous national election campaigns that get all the coverage. Questions that interest the denizen voter are not given a high priority by politicians running for local or county government. Moreover, politicians who are denizens themselves or have naturalized are not nominated by the parties or are ranked low on the list of nominees to the effect that they stand little chance of being elected. But obviously coming from a political culture in one's homeland may also affect the outcome. Chileans and Greeks started out with high levels of participation, approaching that of the Swedish majority population, whereas Americans have consistently shown a very low participation. The Greek series is a cause for alarm. Starting in 1976 with a high participation rate, the Greeks landed with the second lowest participation rate of all in the 1994 election. What experiences of integration does this series represent?

Table 14. Participation in the elections for local and county government in percent of the total number of eligible voters for each category.

Country of citizenship	1976	1979	1982	1985	1988	1991	1994
Chile	-	-	-	77	70	65	59
Denmark	57	46	49	46	41	42	45
Ethiopia	-	-	-	-	-	-	34
Finland	56	51	49	45	39	35	40
Germany	67	64	61	59	52	51	51
Greece	76	65	61	49	46	37	28
Iraq	-	-	-	-	-	-	42
Iran	-	-	-	38	39	41	41
Italy	61	60	58	52	50	44	49
Norway	59	54	52	49	45	46	42
Poland	64	59	54	47	40	36	32
Turkey	63	62	61	54	54	51	47

UK	71	57	55	54	50	48	48
USA	45	45	47	45	44	43	40
ex-Yugoslavia	66	56	52	45	38	35	27
All denizens	60	53	52	48	43	41	40

In the 1994 election there were 293,000 foreign citizens who qualified to vote in the elections. This was approximately 4.3 percent of the electorate.

5.6 Specific youth issues

There are indications that children of international migrants are having trouble with integrating into society. Crime rates is one such indicator. The media have written extensively about street fights, gang warfare and vandalism in which young children of international migrants often tend to be involved. Over the years this created and reinforced a stereotype of these children as an extremely problematic group that society somehow must deal with.

Delinquency and crime start at an early age (in the early teens). The number of persons suspected of crime (or using another statistic, brought to justice) increases rapidly from the age of fourteen and peaks at around the age of twenty, then it gradually decreases. After the age of forty the rates are very low. Thus, crime and delinquency is definitely a youth problem. That is the time when a criminal career commences. Of the 85,250 persons suspected of some offence in 1997 almost one fourth (18,926) were in the age bracket of 15—19 years. The official and published criminal justice data do not give citizenship, country of origin or ethnicity.

In order to analyze the complex problem of immigrant criminality, an empirical study was set up to analyze criminal participation by immigrants and their children for various types of offences. Its aim was to provide an estimate of participation and to analyze the over-representation or under-representation for different categories of foreign born and the specific offences (Ahlberg 1996). Ahlberg established that an over-representation of foreign-born was a fact. This over-representation was also evident for children of international migrants, however, to a lesser degree. A summary and analysis of Ahlberg's data and research is given in Westin (1998b). It should be borne in mind that even though there is a significant over-representation of children of international migrants in the criminal justice statistics, more than 90 per cent of have not been involved in delinquent or criminal activity that has been reported to the police. It is also important to bear in mind that most of the criminal activity in Sweden is committed by ethnic Swedish citizens.

In the study mentioned previously by Virta and Westin (1998; 1999), that was carried out in segregated neighbourhoods and housing areas in Stockholm, the data consistently show that young Turks, Kurds and Chileans have a greater sense of their own worth, a more positive self-identity, better relationships with their parents and are doing better at school than Swedish and Finnish youth. Social class does not account for this unexpected finding. How does this tally with Ahlberg's data? First, crimes rates are about deviant and consequently minority behaviour, the school study is about socially accepted and consequently majority behaviour. Those who are doing well represent a majority, those who are entering a criminal career are a minority

Secondly, what the Virta and Westin study does indicate is that many children of international migrants tend to have higher academic motivation than Swedes and Finns, that a good training or education in Sweden is the way that they can make it in Sweden..

It is established, then, that children of international migrants are overrepresented in delinquency and crime statistics, in unemployment statistics and through their parents in social welfare dependency. However, it is also established that children of international migrants are overrepresented among those who are doing exceptionally well in various fields of competition—in sports, in popular music, in certain types of small business, in the arts and in academia.

One obvious conclusion is that children of international migrants grow up in social and family conditions that are special in some way. Migrants may be characterized on the whole as people with a sense of initiative and openness to new ways of forming their lives. This sense of initiative may well brush off on their children. Children of international migrants are subject to a competition that is stiffer than ethnic Swedish youth. This probably brings out the best in a majority of them, but it may also bring out the worst in those who lose out, those who are marginalized from majority society as well as from their own family and social networks.

One of the problems with the discourse on children of international migrants in Sweden is that the media tends to focus on the problems, on the delinquents, on the drop-outs, thus conveying a conflict image. The overall picture, however, is one in which children of international migrants are doing quite well. This is obvious in sports and popular music. It is also showing up in academic studies.

6 Recent developments in ideas about social integration

6.1 *The problematic concept of integration*

Multiculturalism has become one of the key concepts in the discourse on migration. Different kinds of multicultural states may be identified. One kind is based on imperial conquest, annexation and incorporation of territories not previously part of the state and with populations that are culturally, linguistically and ethnically distinct from the people of the conquering state. Kymlicka (1995) refers to this category as a multination state as opposed to the nation state. The other main type of multicultural society is one that has arisen through large-scale individual migration and settlement. The traditional states of immigration—USA, Canada, Australia, Argentina and Uruguay for example—belong to this category. A third category is one combining some elements of both the first two categories, but also adding other elements. These are mixed kinds of traditional societies in which various ethnic, religious and cultural groups have been able to coexist side by side, not necessarily always in peace but at least before the period of nation building on ethnic lines for the most part in truce. Sarajevo used to be a multicultural city of this kind in the multicultural land of Bosnia.

Integration has become a key issue in the migration and multiculturalism debate. The concept of integration, however, is complex and ambiguous. It is prone to different understandings and interpretations. I will recapitulate three of the frequently found uses of the concept of integration in the context of international migration and ethnic relations.

1. In societies of immigration the settlement and incorporation of the arriving migrants is quite frequently seen in terms of integration. The ways in which migrants and groups of migrants relate to the host society, its language, culture and institutions are discussed by various analysts in terms of acculturation modes. Four options are presented in the following table (modified from Berry):

		maintaining identification with minority culture	
		YES	NO
accepting identification	YES	INTEGRATION	ASSIMILATION
with host society culture	NO	SEPARATION	MARGINALIZATION

Integration is the option of identifying and accepting both the host society (or dominant) culture and at the same time maintaining identification with one's roots in minority (and parent's) culture. Assimilation and separation represent different combinations of acceptance and rejection. Marginalization, finally, is seen as an acculturation strategy rejecting both dominant and minority cultures as foci of identification and acceptance. Intuitively one may feel that marginalized persons are out, lacking social networks, support and access to resources, living on the margins of society as Berry's table seems to imply. However, marginalization may also be given a more positive interpretation. In an intergenerational perspective young people of immigrant origin may want to put distance to their parents' ideas about pursuing values, life-

styles and ways of being of their home countries, but at the same time these youths may find that they are not accepted into dominant society. Xenophobia, prejudice and ethnocentrism tend to give rise to discriminatory practices. Not being admitted or perhaps not wanting to be admitted in either culture can be turned into a positive change. Youth researchers have seen how new identifications and new life-styles are shaped in the multicultural, multiethnic, multi-religious ghettos of major cities. Marginalization, in this perspective, is an indicator of social change in Berry's otherwise rather static model.

2. In a more dynamic perspective, integration doesn't boil down to a choice between different acculturation strategies but a stage of a process over an extended period of time. This perspective draws upon the work of Milton Gordon and the model of gradual incorporation into American society that he presented in his book *Assimilation in American Life*. The classic (European) immigrant to the United States first came in touch with mainstream society through the economy and the labour market. At a somewhat later stage he was trying to make himself understood in English. Language and communication served as a second arena of participation in mainstream and dominant society. In time the migrant was drawn into organizational networks of clubs and associations, and into the political sphere of decision making. Gradually he assumed, or could at least accept the values and norms of mainstream society, and move out from the immigrant dominated housing areas in the major cities into more typically suburban neighbourhoods and establish friendly relationships with people in the neighbourhood, send his children to the same schools and so on. The final stage of Gordon's model is when the former immigrants (or his descendants) accept that their children marry outside of the ethnically or religiously defined immigrant community. According to this model integration is seen as participation in some of these domains—the economy, language and political institutions, but not necessarily social life, values or marriage. Integration thus is a station on the inevitable way to assimilation.

3. In its most general meaning the concept of integration refers to the relationship between the whole and its parts. When the parts are attuned to the whole, the system is said to be integrated. Within sociology integration has been interpreted at the question of social cohesiveness. How is society possible? Georg Simmel once asked, leading us right into sociology's most crucial issue, the question about the foundations of social integration and social cohesiveness. Because society is composed of a large number of complex, hierarchic and parallel subsystems, Simmel's question is really justified. How is it possible for all these parts to be coordinated into a reasonably well functioning whole. Cohesiveness, or integration, is the most distinguishing mark of society, despite the fact that this cohesiveness sometimes doesn't work well, or that it is imperfect in a number of respects.

Integration in the sense of cohesiveness has been studied as a phenomenon that concerns society as a whole, but also within distinct subsections of society—groups, institutions and organizations. The concept of integration is also used to refer to the aims of the EU to harmonize the different member states policies, legislation and economy in the spirit of the Maastricht agreement. The issue of European integration is about making Europe into an economic, political and supra-national whole while at the same time preserving the linguistic, national and cultural distinctiveness of the member states. The question about social cohesiveness was addressed by the classical sociologists.

Two main explanations are given as to how societies can hold together. In some societies cohesiveness is a result of the fact that members basically form their lives according to common and shared values, norms and belief systems. Cohesiveness is an outcome of standardization. Traditionally the church has been the principal conveyer of values and beliefs about the meaning of life, and has therefore served as a means of cohesiveness. In these days it is rather the educational system, the work place and the massmedia which serve as the most important conveyers of values, norms and beliefs. This is what Émile Durkheim referred to as *mechanical solidarity*, which mainly characterized rural and pre-industrial societies. The other principal explanation for social cohesiveness is division of labour and specialization. The division of labour leads to differentiation, that is true, but the aggregated result of all members' doings still is integration because complex interdependencies develop in a system of labour division. Durkheim referred to this foundation for cohesiveness as *organic solidarity*. Integration and cohesiveness are qualities of the social system (the whole), not of individuals or groups (its parts). Society as a whole can be more or less integrated, not individuals.

Durkheim's analysis mainly concerns differentiation within the economy and working life. There exist, however, several other differentiations that serve similar complementary functions, such as gender and generation. Moreover, in a democracy a differentiated party system may equally serve to support societal cohesiveness. There exist institutionalized forms for conflict solution if and when differentiation leads to conflict. Differentiations in terms of culture, religion and ethnicity don't have the corresponding complementarity as an integral part and are consequently a lot more problematic when it comes to integration. Neither do accepted or institutionalized forms of conflict solution exist for cultural, religious or ethnic conflicts.

In this perspective the issue is not to integrate immigrants and their children into society, it is rather to integrate society. This sets the stage for rather different questions and priorities.

6.2 The problems of categorization—the concept of immigrant

When immigration to Sweden started during World War II people of non-Swedish origin were generally referred to as 'foreigners'—officially as well as popularly. It was not until the mid-1960s that the authorities started to become aware of the impact immigration was having on Swedish society. Commissions were set up and policies were drawn up. A step that was taken, the aim being equality, was to do away with the word '*utlänning*' (foreigner) in official communication and public discourse and to introduce the word '*invandrare*', a Swedish synonym for immigrant, a word which at that time didn't have any negative connotations but was rather seen as having welcoming overtones. Words are important but substituting one word for another does not change basic social and structural conditions. The negative evaluations that had been attached to the word '*utlänning*' (foreigner) were in time transferred to the word '*invandrare*' (immigrant) because in the interethnic relations in Sweden people of non-Swedish origin were seen as inferior by large segments of the population.

In recent years the concept of *immigrants* has been criticised for ideological reasons. Today the use and value of the word '*invandrare*' is a matter of heated debate. Many moulders of

opinion feel that it should be discarded because it lumps together people who only have their non-Swedishness in common, and also because it is used in connection with the children of international migrants who may be born in Sweden—second and even third generation *immigrants*. The argument is that using the concept in statistics, policy documents and in other official contexts, perpetuates an outsider status to people of foreign background who reside permanently in Sweden. Logically the status of being an immigrant is confined to a rather brief period of arriving in the country until the authorities have decided to grant the applicant a residence permit.

For practical purposes, researchers, commissions, bureaucrats and others who deal with migration related issues quite frequently use definitions that specify the immigrant sector of society both in terms of country of birth and/or citizenship. The term second generation immigrant is still used in some statistics, but other types of classification have been suggested and are gradually being adopted.

Basically two categorisations are employed in the statistics, namely *country of birth* and *citizenship*, separately and in cross tabulations. The different possibilities are given in the following matrix, which also takes the parents' country of birth into account.

	Two parents born in Sweden <i>Swedish background</i>	One foreign born parent, one Swedish born parent <i>Swedish and foreign background</i>	Two foreign born parents <i>Foreign background</i>
	A	B	C
Swedish citizens born in Sweden 1	A1	B1	C1
Foreign citizens born in Sweden 2	A2	B2	C2
Foreign born Swedish citizens 3	A3	B3	C3
Foreign born foreign citizens 4	A4	B4	C4

Let us briefly explain the meaning of the matrix. Cell A1 represents the majority population of Swedes. Cells B1, B2, C1 and C2 represent the children of international migrants. Cells C3 and C4 represent the actual population of first generation migrants. The remaining cells correspond to various situations of Swedes who have migrated and returned. Cell C3 applies almost exclusively to migrants who have naturalized to Swedish citizenship.

6.3 New initiatives

The Discrimination Ombudsman is an authority founded in 1986 with the task of contributing to the prevention of ethnic discrimination by offering advice and in certain cases assistance to those exposed to differentiated treatment because of their ethnic background, race, religion or other reasons that can be related to their foreign origin. In particular, DO has the authority to supervise cases of discrimination on the labour market, on the one hand by investigating on the other hand by taking such cases to Court by own initiative. DO is also expected to undertake active measures of a general character in order to counteract ethnic discrimination and provide advice to Government and other bodies on legislation and other measures which may be taken, likely to counteract ethnic discrimination. The legal side of the Ombudsman's office has not worked satisfactorily. It has been difficult to bring alleged cases of discrimination to court, and even harder to get a conviction. Much of the work has therefore been concentrated to public opinion moulding.

The National board of integration was established in 1998. Its main task is to promote the integration of migrant populations in society. The board is still preoccupied by finding its role in society, but on assignment that it has been engaged in is the launching of the programme *Diversity in the work place*. Companies, organizations and authorities are required to work towards the goal of diversity in their staff policies. Things haven't developed very rapidly. Some smaller organizations, however, have worked out their own understanding of the goal and are taking measures to achieve it. It is harder going for large companies and organizations. Much of the work is about attitude moulding and not so much about an exact representation the total distribution of different ethnicities, religions and cultural backgrounds in the staff. There is a degree of overlapping in the different tasks between the Ombudsman against ethnic and racial discrimination and the National board of integration.

7 Conclusions

To date the policies of integration have not been particularly effective. Despite the recent upturn of the economy unemployment rates remain at an exceptionally high level for non-European immigrants, but also for more recent arrivals from Yugoslavia. There are no indications that segregation in the housing market is on the way down. In terms of health, the adult immigrant population is way behind the Swedes. The general aetiology is complex, but there don't seem to be any signs of improvement. This has partly got to do with the kind of immigrants that are accepted. Besides Yugoslavia, Iraq has been the largest sending country. War experiences and political traumatization are common. For reasons that have to do with the labour market the immigrant population is more dependent on social welfare allowances to a larger extent than their share of the total population. This right is not questioned by the authorities but the heavy social welfare dependency does tend to reinforce age-old prejudices against people of foreign origin. There is moreover an overrepresentation in the crime rates, which also adds significantly to prejudicial attitudes.

On the positive side one finds that crime rates for the children of international migrants are lower than those of their parents' generation. If high crime rates may be seen as an indicator of malfunctioning integration this observation is a positive sign. It means, however, that integration into the receiving society is a long-term undertaking. Another positive sign is the fact that the schools seem to be working for the children of international migrants despite heavy cuts in their budgets.

Critically assessing the situation, I would contend that the policies of integration are confused. Partly this confusion may account for the rather negative outcomes. The integration policies look much too much like a kind of concealed assimilation policy. Even more confusing is programme that was launched in conjunction with the Bosnian refugees—integration in view of repatriation, an undertaking which logically hardly makes sense. The policy to repatriate refugees to their countries of origin once the political situation is stabilized is perhaps a final retreat from the proud slogans of 1974 announcing the birth of Swedish multiculturalism.

Perhaps there never was any true intention to promote cultural diversity. Perhaps the multicultural slogans of the 1970s were a parenthesis. They were born at a time when Sweden could afford to express a generous attitude to the immigrants it needed in the 1950s and 1960s. A study of the Italians in Sweden carried out in the late 1970s bears witness to a remarkably rapid process of assimilation (Engelbrektsson 1981). The "multicultural" society that is developing today is hardly one that is characterized by cultural diversity, mutual understanding and respect between ethnic groups, different as to their cultural identities but equal in social status. A more likely scenario today is one of developing class stratification along ethnic and cultural lines, as Ålund & Schierup (1991) project. For true cultural diversity to develop, Swedish authorities will have to slacken their control. They will have to let things develop in their natural course. They will have to reduce some of the bureaucratic red tape and organizational superstructure. There is bound to be conflict and social discord. The question is whether Swedish society is prepared to embark upon a journey towards true multiculturalism or if different groups will turn against one another, protecting their assets and interests in a future marked by drastic cuts in the welfare sector and mutual distrust.

Maybe the slogans of 1974 were nothing but slogans, empty declarations. An enormous task ahead is to set the balance of scales right.

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